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Notes
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A LImiTATION UPON THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER
THE modem tendency to extend legislation under the federal commerce power
raises the question of the extent to which Congress may exercise that power directly
upon the states themselves. In a recent case the United States brought suit in a
federal district court against the State of California as a common carrier to recover
a penalty for violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act' on the state-owned
Belt Railroad. The state defended on the ground that it could not constitutionally-
be subjected to the provisions of the Act inasmuch as it operates the Belt Line
not for profit, but merely to facilitate commerce as an incident of its control of the
San Francisco harbor-the performance of a public function by the state in its
sovereign capacity. On jurisdictional grounds alone, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment obtained against the state in the district court.2
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that by engaging in interstate commerce by
rail California subjected itself as a common carrier to the commerce power, and
thus to the terms of the Act. The Court considered it "unimportant to say whether
the state conducts its railroad in its 'sovereign' or in its 'private' capacity."8
The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce has in the past been de-
clared to be plenary in scope,4 free from interference by the states,5 paramount to
all state legislation in the premises,6 capable of being "exerted to its utmost extent
over every part of such commerce," 7 and acknowledging "no limitations other than
are prescribed in the Constitution."8  Accordingly, it has been held that federal
1. 27 STAT. 531 (1893), 45 U. S. C. A. § 2 (1926), and 29 STAT. 85 (1896), 45 U. S. C. A.
§ 6 (1926).
2. State of California v. United States, 75 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935). Under 36
STAT. 1156 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 341 (1926), the Court held that the Supreme CoutY had
exclusive jurisdiction of suits to which a state is a party, and hence that the District Court
was without jurisdiction of the cause. In sustaining the jurisdiction of the District Court,
the Supreme Court held that Section 233 of the Judicial Code, on which the cou'rt below
relied, originally enacted as section 13 of the judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 80, was in con-
flict with and supplanted in such cases as this by the terms of the later enacted Sality
Appliance Act, 29 STAT. 85 (1896), 45 U. S. C. A. § 6 (1926), providing that suits there-
under should be brought in the federal district court in the locality where the violation
occurred. Any resultant inconvenience or loss of dignity to the state by reason of Its being
sued in a district court was considered out-weighed by the "complete appropriateness of the
court and venue selected" for this essentially local trial. United States v. State of Cali-
fornia, 56 Sup. Ct. 421, 425-426 (1936).
3. United States v. State of California, 56 Sup. Ct. 421 (1936).
4. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 197 (U. S. 1824); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States,
222 U. S. 20 (1911).
5. State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1872) (tax upon transportation) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347 (1887). Cf. Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd.
of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (1886) ; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894) ; 2 Tuci=RE
o T= CoNsrTUTiox (1899) 549.
6. State of South Carolina v. State of Georgia, 93 U. S. 4 (1876) ; Monongahela Bridge
Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910); Spokane & I. E. Rr. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U. S.
497 (1916).
7. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 47 (1912).
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (U. S. 1824).
authority under the commerce power "is superior to that of the states to provide
for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants"; o that freedom from interference
by the states "is not confined to a simple prohibition of laws impairing it, but
extends to interference by any ultimate organ," and the "state cannot avoid the
operation of this rule by simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police
power." 10 On the other hand, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution purported
to preserve the separate identity of the state and federal governments, contemplating
in a measure sovereign states within a sovereign nation." With varying degrees of
success the Court has maintained this line of demarcation to preserve the vitality
of state and local autonomy. However, even though the activity involved in the
present case is conceded to be interstate in character, the issue is fairly presented
whether a state's legitimate functions preserved by the Tenth Amendment are not
equally transgressed by direct subjection of the state to the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce as they are by an invasion of the intrastate sphere.
It may be argued that in this case the State of California could have no real
objection to maintaining the standards of equipment prescribed for any private
carrier. But on the conceptual level the issue assumes broader proportions. The
instant decision may indicate that the states are amenable to federal regulation not
only when departing from activities in which the states have traditionally engaged,
but also whenever the activity of the state, even in its essential functions of govern-
ment, conflicts with a federal regulation of interstate commerce.12 Thus, the same
reasoning and language which, in reiterating the broad sweep of the commerce power,
considered inconsequential the sovereign character of both the act done and the
defendant actor, might well be relied upon to uphold the constitutionality of legis-
lation more likely to encounter political opposition from the states.
For example, the Securities Act 13 might be extended to include state and municipal
securities in interstate transactions.' 4 In justification of such a policy, despite the
9. Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 426 (1925).
10. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U. S. 75, 78-79 (1914).
See Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334 (1907).
11. See Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (U. S. 1863); Collector v. Day, 11'Wall. 113,
125 (U. S. 1870) ; Hopkins Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 56 Sup. Ct. 235, 241 (1935) ;
1 SToRy ox =E CoNsnON (5th ed. 1891) 317; Dodd, Adjustment of the Corstitution to
New Needs (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 126, 127.
12. That the operation of facilities incident to control of a harbor has always been
considered a sovereign function is demonstrated rather exhaustively in Commissioners of
Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck, 76 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). See also, Sherman v.
United States, 282 U. S. 25, 29 (1930) (California has not gone into business generally as
a common carrier; the Belt Line is merely "an incident of its control of the harbor-a
State prerogative"). However, that this view seems not to have been fully accepted by
the Court in the instant case, despite its professed disinclination to pass upon the point,
is suggested in its language concerning "a business carried on by a state" (56 Sup. Ct., at
425), and from the cases cited in support of the federal taxing power with reference to
state activities (56 Sup. Ct., at 424). CL City of New York v. Federal Radio Comm., 36 F.
(2d) 115 (App. D. C. 1929) (radio station as governmental function of city subject to
federal regulation); Mlathewes v. Port Utilities Comm. of Charleston, 32 F. (2d) 913 (E. D.
S. C. 1929).
13. 48 STAT. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 77a-77aa (1933).
14. The Act now specifically exempts from its operation both state and municipal
securities. 43 STAT. 76 §.3 (a) (2), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (a) (2) (1933). That exemption
does not apply, however, to fraudulent interstate transactions. 48 STAT. 84 § 17, 15 U. S.
C. A. § 77q (1933). The constitutionality of the Securities Act in its present form will be
assumed, for the purposes of this discussion.
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alleged inroad upon state sovereignty, it might be contended that any material inter-
ference with state or municipal borrowing power is more than offset by the protection
thus afforded to investors in such securities throughout the country, a protection
possibly well merited in view of present conditions of default in municipal obliga-
tions.1 5 Furthermore, this position might find constitutional support in the argu-
ment that a state has no unrestricted privilege of borrowing money beyond its own
borders as an attribute of sovereignty, and that it remains subject to the same
limitations on that privilege at the instance of the federal government as could be
imposed by the several states were they politically foreign to each other.10 If it
offered its securities for sale through interstate channels, the instant ruling would
apparently justify the subjection of the state to the provisions of the Act, even
though the result were in practical effect to restrict the state's ability to borrow
money. In the words of the Court, "The only question we need consider is whether
the exercise of that power, in whatever capacity, must be in subordination to the
power to regulate commerce, which has been granted specifically to the national
government. The sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent
of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution. . . .The state
can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than
can an individual." 17
Although in the field of taxation a mutual forbearance has been enjoined upon
both the state and federal governments,18 the Court would acknowledge "no such
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce." But the language of the
Constitution makes no such distinction-the powers are equally plenary in terms.
However, working from the premise "that the power to tax involves the power to
destroy,"1 9 the Court has built up an inherent limitation on that power to preserve
the existence of both state and federal governments.' 8 Yet that intergovernmental
immunity today is not so complete as the premise would seem to require, but rather
is predicated upon the degree of ultimate interference with essential functions of
government involved in a given exercise of the power by either state or nation.2 0
It would seem that this same test might be applied to legislation under the commerce
power unless that power differs in nature from the power of taxation in such a way
15. Stason, State Administrative Supervision of MunicipaT Indebtedness (1932) 30 Miau.
L. REv. 833, 834.
16. State and municipal securities cannot be made tax exempt by the issuing state out-
side its own jurisdiction. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (1881).
17. United States v. State of California, 56 Sup. Ct. 421, 424 (1936).
18. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829); Dobbins v. Commis-
sioners, 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870); United States
v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322 (U. S. 1872); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S.
429, 586 (1895).
19. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431, (U. S. 1819).
20. Wilcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 (1931); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514
(1926); Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and State Taxation in
Intergovernmental Relations-1930-1932 (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 247, 256. But, it may be
said, though it may be implicit in our fede~al system that both state and nation are to be
assured a mutually independent power of taxation, there is no such concurrent power
reserved to the states in the field of interstate commerce. However, it was not the conflict
of state and federal authority, concurrently exerted upon the same subject-matter, which
gave rise to the limitation upon their taxing power, but rather the exercise by one In
such manner as to impair the essential activities of the other as a government. See First
Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353, 362 (U. S. 1869); South Carolina v. United States,
199 U. S. 437, 456, 463 (1905) ; Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934).
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that its exercise cannot constitute a threat to state sovereignty. And this difference
may exist, at least conceptually, for it is difficult to understand how the sovereign
can complain of regulation of commerce beyond its own borders.10  Nevertheless,
subjection of state securities to federal regulation under the commerce clause might
be considered an impairment of the sovereign borrowing power at least equal to that
resulting from taxing them.21 To the extent, therefore, that regulations of commerce
are comparable with the exercise of the taxing power in their capacity not alone to
destroy but to impair sovereign activities of the states, it may be questioned whether
that conflict should be dismissed with a mere recital of the plenary scope of the
federal power.
A similar conflict could arise from the application of the federal bankruptcy power
to municipal debt readjustment.m That impairment of state governmental policy
is possible under federal court administration of municipal finances is reflected in
the hesitancy with which Congress has entered the field.P The possibility would
be even greater should Congress authorize the filing of an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy against the municipalities, rather than only the voluntary petition as
at present. But, on the authority of the principal case, it would seem to be no
objection to the exercise of a power specifically granted to the federal government
that it may affect sovereign functions of the state. If municipalities are fit subjects
for bankruptcy administration at all,2 4 consent of the states, now considered a
requisite, 25 would appear to be unnecessary. Although recent expressions of the
Court suggest that the bankruptcy power of Congress is "a field whose boundaries
may not yet be fully revealed,"20 there appears to be little reason for according
it any greater freedom from inherent limitation than either the taxing power or that
of regulating interstate commerce.
While the commerce power, being specifically granted to Congress, has been termed
plenary, yet it is limited by the Constitution itself. Since the Constitution contem-
plates the continued existence of the states as well as the unhampered exercise of
powers granted to the national government, each would seem to that extent necessarily
limited by the other. If the Court should wish to reach that result as to the com-
merce power, when a proper case arises, without repudiating the instant decision, it
might do so by invalidating the legislation on the ground that the degree of encroach-
ment on state power rendered it unreasonable or arbitrary.27 Moreover, this might
21. See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 468 (U. S. 1829); Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 586 (U. S. 1895).
22. A M cPAL DrBT R.AD -sTmENT AcT, 48 STAT. 789 §§ 78,80, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-
303 (1934).
23. 48 STAT. 802 § 80 (k), 11 U. S. C. A. § 303 (k) (1934) (requiring written approval
of any state agency already in control of finances of a defaulting municipality, and dis-
affirming any impairment of state control of its political subdivisions).
24. See Opinion of Special Assistant Attorney General Charles Weston, is.ued 1933, 1
C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, par. 2803, p. 957.
25. 48 STAT. 802 § S0 (k), 11 U. S. C. A. § 303 (k) (1934); In re Cameron County
Water Improvement DisL No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103 (S. D. Texas, 1934); In Ye East Contra
Costa Irr. Dist., 10 F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1935); In re Imperial Irr. Dist., 10 F. Supp.
832 (S. D. Cal. 1935). Cf. Weston, supra note 24, at 962.
26. Continental Ill. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 671
(1935).
27. In its exercise of the commerce power, Congress is limited by the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. See Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336
(1893) ; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 172, 180 (1908); United States v. Cress, 243
U. S. 316, 326 (1917). But even if the state is not to be considered a "person" entitled to
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prove desirable because it would provide an escape from any unfortunate precedents
in the taxation cases 28 and afford the Court a more flexible standard for exercising
its statesmanship through a balancing of the interests involved.
TAXABILITY OF STOCK DIVIDENDS AS INCOME
WHETHER a stock dividend is or is not income subject, when received, to federal
taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment is still an unsettled problem.1 In Eisner
v. Macomber, where a common stockholder was paid a dividend in common shares
of the same corporation, the Supreme Court held that stock dividends are not taxable
income when received, but are merely furth9r evidence of the taxpayer's investment,
taxable only when sold. 2 However, this decision has seemingly been limited to the
type of stock dividends there involved, for the Court has since held that a stock-
holder receives taxable income when paid a dividend in stock of what appears to be
only a nominally different corporation.8
Two recent cases before different circuit courts of appeals revive this problem
by raising the question whether a stockholder receives income when paid a dividend
in an existing class of stock of the same corporation, but of a different class of
stock from that- originally held. In both cases a preferred stockholder had been
paid a dividend in common stock. Subsequently he sold his preferred shares, but
retained his common stock, received as dividends. In order to determine the amount
of taxable gain resulting from this sale, it was necessary for the courts to decide
whether the stock dividend should be treated as income or merely as additional
evidence of the taxpayer's capital investment. For if it is the latter, then since
the taxpayer has, in effect, sold only part of his capital investment, the original
cost of his holdings must be allocated between the two classes of stock upon the
basis of that proportion which the fair market value of each class at the time of
the payment of the stock dividend bears to the total market value of both classes
at that time.4 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Commis-
challenge legislation under the Fifth Amendment, the commerce power may itself be limited
to reasonable regulations. Cf. Hammer v. Dagenhatt, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); Brooks v.
United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925) ; Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce (1933)
18 CoRr. L. Q. 477; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rr. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935);
Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes (1935) 49 HAtv. L. Rzv. 1, 193.
28. See, e. g., Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620 (1929). The test of tax-
ability might better be rested on the degree of interference with essential functions of gov-
ernment, practical adjustment rather than rigid doctrinal immunity. See Brown, supra
note 20. Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934) (state liquor system taxed); Helvering
v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934) (salaries of state trustees operating railroad taxed),
1. The Constitution prohibits a federal tax on capital as such without apportionment
among the states on the basis of population. Hence it is considered necessary to distin-
guish between capital and income.
2. 252 U. S. 189 (1920). See for a recent discussion of the problem, Rottschaefer, Con-
cept of Income in Federal Taxation (1929) 13 Mim. L. REv. 637.
3. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (1921); Rockefeller v. United States, 257
U. S. 176 (1921); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134 (1923); Marr v. United Stateg, 268
U. S. 536 (1925). Contra: Weiss v. Steam, 265 U. S. 242 (1924). For an attempt to
reconcile these holdings, see Comment (1926) 20 Ir. L. REv. 601.
4. The difference in taxes according to whether the allocation process is or is not
applied can be illustrated by a hypothetical case. Assume the taxpayer invested $500 In
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sioner v. Tillotson Mfg. Co. that such a dividend in stock of a class different from
the taxpayer's original investment is income and that, therefore, the original cost
should not be so allocated.5 On the other hand, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit more recently held in Commissioner v. Koshland that the original
cost must be allocated, one judge dissenting. 6 These conflicting decisions result
from different constructions of a provision in the internal revenue laws, enacted
shortly after the Macomber decision, which states that "a stock dividend shll not
be subject to tax."7 In the Tillotson case this statute was by implication limited
in its application to stock dividends not constitutionally taxable as income, such as
those considered in the Macomber case.8 On the other hand, the court in the
Koshland case construed the statute as indicating that all stock dividends are to be
treated as additional evidence of capital investment for all purposes of taxation,
irrespective of whether they could constitutionally have been taxed as income.0
While nothing compels one statutory construction rather than the other, the second
seems a more reasonable interpretation of the legislative intention. Since the statute
was initially enacted as a result of the Macomber decision, it can hardly be argued
that in the light of the comprehensive scope of that decision Congress had any basis
for assuming any particular type of stock dividend to be taxable income. And it
also seems probable that had it been intended to limit stock dividends not subject
to tax to any particular type, Congress would have so specified. Moreover, it is
arguable that the second construction is more desirable as a matter of policy, since
at least for the immediate present it removes from judicial contemplation the trouble-
some question as to what stock dividends are income and thus allows all stock
dividends to be treated alike.
If, however, the statutory construction in the Tillotson case is followed, it must
be decided whether such a stock dividend is or is not income for purposes of federal
taxation.10 In resolving this question the Supreme Court can choose between two
his original share of preferred stock, which later increased in value to $600. Then cup-
pose he was paid a dividend in common stock, which then had a fair market value Jf 100,
and that this dividend reduced the fair market value of his original preferred share to
$500. If this taxpayer should sell both his shares at the same time, it would be immaterial
in result whether the original cost is allocated. But if he at one time sells his original
preferred share at $600 and at some later date sells his common stock dividend at $200,
his tax at either date will differ according to whether the cost is allocated. In the case
of his original preferred stock the taxable gain will amount to only 100 if there is no
allocation, whereas if there is allocation, he will be taxed on a gain of $185. Similarly
in the case of his common stock dividend his gain will amount to $200 without allocation,
whereas with allocation his taxable gain will be only $115.
See 2 PA-uL MA MLRTmis, Law op FEmm= Iucoar TA:XATroN (1934) § 18.26. See for
general discussions of the complicated problems of computation created by the Macomber
holding, Maggs, Computation of Income (1924) 13 CL. L. Rv. 13; Comment (1934) 12
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 283.
S. 76 F. (2d) 189 (1934), aff'g 27 B. T. A. 913 (1933).
6. Decided Jan. 20, 1936, rev'g 30 B. T. A. 1462 (1934).
7. 42 STAT. 228 § 201 (d) (1921); 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (f) (1935).
8. This construction has been considered "unsound." See 1 PAUL mw MAI -m~s, LAw
or FEDmAm INcoam TAX.ATiON (1934) 388, note S.
9. The statute might also be construed as merely exempting all stock dividends from
taxation when received and as having no bearing on the collateral problem of allocation,
presented in the instant cases. Such a construction would make the problem a matter
for judicial determination.
10. For purposes of determining whether such a dividend is to accrue to a life tenant
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precedents, 1 which establish seemingly contradictory tests for determining when
income is realized. The first of these tests is that formulated in the Macomber
case, where it was held that to be income, capital gain must both be severed from
the corporation's capital and be received by the taxpayer for his separate use. If
this test is applied, no stock dividends can, be taxed, as income, since they do not
satisfy the first requirement.' 2 The second test is that established in Marr v. United
States, where the Court impliedly repudiated the first requirement in the Macomber
case and held that a taxpayer receives income when he acquires something essentially
different from the interest which he had prior to the happening of the event on
which it is sought to make income depend.' 3 If this test is applied, only those
stock dividends may be taxed which satisfy this "essentially different" requirement.
While the Macomber test would, if strictly followed, bar any attempt to tax
stock dividends as income and would thereby lead to a desirable certainty in this
important phase of tax law, 14 the test is objectionable in that it postpones taxation
until the dividend shares are sold. Thus, some taxpayers may, because of surtaxes,
be subjected to an eventually heavier tax burden than would have been the case had
they been taxed on such dividends when received.15 Likewise, this delay in collection
may allow other taxpayers to avoid paying any tax by taking such gains only when
there are losses to set off against them.' 6
These undesirable results may in many instances be eliminated by applying the
test in the Marr case, which seems to provide a workable rule insofar as it makes
the essential element in realization the acquisition of an interest in property in which
the taxpayer had formerly no interest.1 7 But if this case is followed, the Macomber
or to a remainderman, the problem would seem to be so entirely unlike that presented
in tax cases that it is possible that such a dividend could be considered not income in the
first instance and income in the other. For a case treating the problem as between life
tenant and remainderman, see Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (1890).
11. If the present Supreme Court should find it necessary to decide this problem,
its decision would appear to depend upon the views of the three new justices appointed
since the Marr case was decided in 1925. In that case Justices Brandeis and Stone voted with
the Court whereas Justices Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds, and VanDevanter dis.ented
on the ground that the Court should have adhered to the test established in the Macomber
case.
12. A dividend paid in shares of a different corporation satisfies both requirements and,
therefore, constitutes taxable income. Such a dividend has not been deemed a "stock
dividend" and is not so considered in this note. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (1918);
see MoNTGomRy, FimuL TAx HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1933) 294.
13. 268 U. S. 536 (1925). This decision could well be interpreted to have retained
the Macomber decision to the extent of still holding that to constitute income there must
be realization by separation of income from principal. But the test of realization established
in the latter case must be held repudiated in so far as separation has been more broadly
defined.
14. It has been said that the Court has "taken advantage of the changing personnel of
the Court to play tag with these decisions." See Note (1926) 12 VA. L. Raw. 319, at 323.
15. See Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends (1922) 35 HAiv. L. Rav. 363, at 390.
16. See for other instances of possible inequalities resulting from the Macomber hold-
ing, Seligman, Effects of the Stock Dividend Decision (1921) 21 COL. L. Rzv. 312, at 330.
17. This appears to be a more realistic test than that in the Macomber case, since the
test there established is anomalous in so far as it inquires into the effect of a stock dividend
on the corporation. It would seem that the effect upon the stockholder as an individual
should be the only consideration in seeking to determine whether he has obtained taxable
income.
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case should be overruled' s so that every stock dividend will be deemed to con-
stitute an "essentially" different interest. For otherwise this test may in practice
prove as objectionable as that in the Macomber case, since if a narrower view is
taken, this phase of tax law will be unsettled until the Court has passed upon all
the various types of stock dividends. In the instant cases, for example, application
of the Marr case test would seem to justify taxing the stock dividends as income.
For the taxpayer's original interest in the corporation has been changed both in
kind and in extent, since new voting rights afford an increased measure of control
over the corporate management, and there are also greater possibilities of profit-
sharing. Furthermore, in the event of corporate liquidation it is possible that as a
result of this stock dividend such a taxpayer may acquire a larger share in the
distribution of the corporation's assets; to that extent he may be said to have
received an increased capital interest, resulting in a corresponding diminution of the
prexisting proportionate interest of the common stockholders' 0 Likewise, the Afarr
case test of "essentially different interest" would justify inclusion in taxable income
of stock dividends in the form of other types of securities of the same corporation,
such as payments to stockholders in bonds,20 or to common stockholders in existing
preferred shares.21 But although in such instances22 it would seem that the same
result should follow as in the instant cases, it is likely that the Court will distinguish
some stock dividends from others, for purposes of determining whether income has
been realized by their distribution, and will thus create an undesirable and unnecessary
uncertainty in this field.
18. It can be argued that a taxpayer's interest in such a situation as that considered in
the Macomber case has been materially changed in that after this dividend his stock is
more readily salable and at perhaps advanced market prices and in that there has thereby
been created a new right as against the corporation to have the money, formerly held as
surplus, permanently retained in the enterprise as capital. See Seligman, Effects of the
Stock Dividend Decision (1921) 21 COL. L. Rav. 313, at 326.
19. See for a similar analysis, Seligman, Effects of the Stock Dividend Dedzion (1921)
21 CoL. L. Ray. 313, at 319.
20. Such dividends apparently comply with the "essentially different" test. For, by
reason of such a dividend the stockholder becomes a corporate creditor and thereby as-
sumes a position analogous to that of a stockholder in a corporation which has declared,
but not yet paid, a cash dividend. Such a dividend has been held taxable income. Doerschucl
v. United States, 274 Fed. 739 (E. D. N. Y. 1921). But under a strict application of the
test in the Macomber case a bond dividend could not be deemed taxable income. See
Fairchild, Stock Dividend Decision 5 Bur.raLmr NATxoNmA TAx Assocm7ioxz No. 7, p. 210.
21. An essentially different interest could here be deemed to have been acquired. For
if there is not sufficient surplus to pay more than the stipulated dividends on the original
preferred, or if in liquidation the corporate assets are insufficient to pay the original pre-
ferred shareholders, such a taxpayer's interest will by reason of the stock dividend be
increased at the expense of the original preferred stockholders. In two recent cases the Board
of Tax Appeals has held such a dividend taxable income. James H. Torrens, 31 B. T. A.
787 (1934); H. C. Gowran, 32 B. T. A. 820 (1935).
22. Other cases may also present this problem. Thus a proportional redistribution of
existing and inchoate rights would seem to occur where some stockholders elect to receive
a cash dividend, and the other stockholders elect to be paid in the corporation's stock.
This would seem to constitute an essentially different interest. See for;To:,zsm, F=nMUL
TAx HxNDBoox (2d ed. 1933) 296. But cf. United States v. Mfellon, 281 Fed. 64S (C. C.
A. 3d, 1922); United States v. Davison, I F. (2d) 465 (W. D. Penn. 1924), aff'd 9 F.
(2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926).
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Perhaps most of these difficulties could be avoided were the Court to adopt a
different concept of income, discarding the theory of realization and holding that
the owner of an asset comes into the possession of income whenever an increase in
the value of that asset is definite enough to be susceptible of evaluation in terms
of money.m If this concept were applied, the problem would for the most part cease
to be a judicial problem, and Congress could tax the increased capital value repre-
sented by stock dividends at any time it proved convenient as a matter of
administration.
EFrECT OF THE JENSEN RULE ON RIGHT Or NONMARITIME WORXER INJURED ON
NAVIGABLE WATERS To REcovER UNDER STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION STATUTE
To facilitate actions to recover for injuries arising from employer-employee rela-
tionships, the vast majority of the states have enacted workmen's compensation
statutes.1 Although ordinarily applicable only to land workers, the protection of
these statutes has been extended to maritime workers whose injuries were sustained
on land.2 But a perplexing problem exists as to the applicability of the state
compensation statutes when a nonmaritime worker, injured upon navigable waters
while acting in the course of his employment, seeks recovery. In a recent case,
plaintiff who was employed by defendant construction company as a bricklayer in
the erection of a penitentiary on Riker's Island in New York Harbor, was injured
as a result of an explosion on a boat which was carrying him to work on the island,
Defendant had contracted with the owner of a ferry boat for the daily transportation
of its employees to and from the island, had ordered its employees to take this
particular ferry and none other, and had guaranteed the ferry owner that he would
receive at least sixty dollars a day from the ten cent fares charged the employees.
Plaintiff's claim for compensation under the New York Workmen's Compensation
23. Some economists have long urged such a theory of income. See Haig, The Federal
Income Tax (1921) 2-15. Contra: Fisher, Income Concept in Light of Experience (1927).
If unrealized losses are also allowed as deductions, a tax on unrealized gains does not
seem unfair. Indeed such a tax would eliminate some of the inequities in the present sys-
tem of taxation. For example, a taxpayer is at the present time taxed to the full amount
of a cash dividend. But because usually some part at least of the surplus in the corporate
treasury, the existence of which made possible the issuance of the dividend, had already been
acquired by the company at the time when the individual stockholder bought his stock,
the dividend in cash represents, in part at least, some portion of his original investment.
In Germany a tax has been levied on unrealized accretion in value to capital. See 37
FiNAz-ARcizv 306.
Because taxes must be paid in cash, it seems but fair that a tax should be Imposed
only where the increased capital value has been translated into cash or into something
which can readily be converted into cash. Stock dividends would in most instances be
readily so convertible. Any fear of legislative abuse in unfairly taxing other unrealized
gains seems unwarranted, for administrative difficulties render it impractical to tax most
unrealized income. See Seligman, Effects of the Stock Dividend Decision (1921) 21
CoT. L. Rv. 313, at 315.
1. By December 31, 1931, 44 states had enacted workmen's compensation statutes. See
AssoCIATIoN oF CASUALTY AND SuREry ExEcuTvEs, DioEsT OF WoRYMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws (12th ed. 1931).
2. State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U. S. 263 (1922);
T. Smith and Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 (1928).
1936] NOTES 1127
Statute3 was granted by the Industrial Board after a finding that he was injured
in the course of his employment. Defendant construction company and defendant
insurer appealed from this award, arguing that, since plaintiff was injured while a
passenger on a boat on navigable waters, his cause of action was in tort against
the ferry owner and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty where the
state compensation statutes were inapplicable. The Court of Appeals, however, three
judges dissenting, sustained the award.4 It held that plaintiff's suit was not against
the ferry owner to recover damages for the tortious injuries sustained on navigable
waters, but rather was against defendant employer to recover compensation for having
been injured in the course of his contract of employment. Since this contract,
whether totally nonmaritime in nature or not, contemplated nonmaritime work which
was purely of local character, the application of the state compensation statute
would not interfere with the uniformity of the general maritime law.
It has been well settled, since Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensct,' that a person injured
on navigable waters while performing maritime services under his contract of employ-
ment cannot recover compensation under a state's workmen's compensation law.0
For the enforcement of such a local statute in purely maritime causes of action has
been held to have the effect of prejudicing the requirement of uniformity in the
maritime law.7 Recovery under the state compensation statutes has been consistently
allowed, however, where a workman was injured upon navigable waters while per-
forming services, under his contract of employment, which were designated as non-
maritime in nature or local in concern with no effect upon navigation or commerce.8
3. New YORr WoRmxe's ComvEarsATioT LAw (1922).
4. Heaney v. P. J. Carlin Construction Co., 269 N. Y. 93, 199 N. E. 16 (1935), ailg
243 App. Div. 648, 277 N. Y. Supp. 754 (3d Dep't 1935); cf. Dingfelt v. Albee Godfrey
Whale Creek Co., Inc., 284 N. Y. Supp. 358 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1936).
5. 244 U. S. 205 (1917), 1rev'g 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600 (1915).
For comments on the doctrine of this case, -ee Morrison, Worhrmen's Conpnsaion and
the Maritime Law (1929) 38 YA=. L. J. 472, and references cited thetein, at n. 2.
6. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co. Inc., 247 U. S. 372 (1918); Great Lakes Dredge
and Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479 (1923); Gonsalves v. Mlorse Dry Dock and
Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171 (1924); London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 279 U. S. 109 (1929); John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S.
222 (1930); Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233 (1930).
7. That this doctrine of uniformity was announced before the Jensen case, see The
Lottawanna, 88 U. S. 558, 574-575 (1874). Howeve", in some instancL, state statutes
had been incorporated into, and enforced in admiralty. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U. S. 205, 216, 246, 247 (1917). And in the exercise of the power saved to them
in admiralty cases to grant a common law remedy, whenever the common law was
competent to give it, the state courts had been accustomed to grant recovery under their
local compensation statutes for maritime injuries. 1 STAT. 76 (1789); continued in 42 STAT.
634 (1922), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (3) (1927). Walker v. Clyde S. S. Co, 215 N, Y. 529,
109 N. E. 604 (1915), rev'd 244 U. S. 255 (1917); Steamship Bowdoin Co. v. Pillsbury,
174 Cal. 390, 163 Pac. 204 (1917), rev'd 246 U. S. 648 (1918).
After the Jensen case, however, the doctrine of uniformity was invoked by the Sup reme
Court to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional which attempted to save to suitorm
rights under the state compensation laws. 40 STAr. 395 (1917); Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920). When the Act was reenacted, excepting masters and
seamen from its provisions, it was again held unconstitutional. 42 STAT. 634 (1922),
28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (3) (1926); Washington v. Dawson and Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924).
See Comment (1925) 34 YAr.E L. J. 298.
8. Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922); State Industrial Board v.
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In such cases, the judicial requirement of uniformity in the maritime law was held
not to preclude the application of the state laws 9
In the instant case, it seems clear that when the plaintiff was injured on navigable
waters, he was performing no services which were either maritime in nature or
other than local in concern. He was merely travelling to work under his employer's
orders, thus bringing himself within the course of his contract of employment. 10
This contract envisaged purely nonmaritime functions of a local nature, to wit,
construction work on a land penitentiary, and in no wise included any work which
might be designated as maritime or related to navigation or commerce. Furthermore,
it seems fairly clear that the provisions incorporated into the contract regarding
maritime travel, to enable plaintiff to reach his place of work, were but incidental
to the principal objective of the contract and would not have the effect of changing
an otherwise nonmaritime contract of employment into a maritime one."1  Thus il
would appear that recovery under the New York Compensation Laws12 was properly
granted by the New York courts. 1'
However, at the time of his injuries, the plaintiff was also engaged in another
Terry and Tench Co. Inc., 273 U. S. 639 (1926); Rosengrant v. Havard, 273 U. S. 664
(1927); Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 276 U. S. 467
(1928); Sultan Ry. and Timber Co. v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 277 U. S. 135
(1928). Also Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59 (1926).
9. For a statement of some of the rules involved, cf. La Casse v. Great Lakes Engineer-
ing Works, 242 Mich. 454, 219 N. W. 730 (1928), noted (1928) 27 Micir. L. Rav. 191.
Another approach, based on conflicting tests of jurisdiction is suggested by Morrison,
supra note 5, at 483 et seq. For a suggestion that the mere locality of the tort may not
be sufficient to give admiralty jurisdiction, see Huo s, AnmTyAI (2d ed. 1920) 216-220;
B-N.Dicr, AniAL.T'Y (5th ed. 1925) § 127.
10. Matter of Onisk v. Knaust Bros., 225 App. Div. 186, 232 N. Y. Supp. 541 (3d Dep't
1929), aff'd 250 N. Y. 569, 166 N. E. 327 (1929) ; Alberta Contracting Corp. v. Santomasslmo,
107 N. J. L. 7, 150 AtI. 830 (Sup. Ct. 1930). That this is the general rule, see In ye
Spencer Kellog and Sons, 52 F. (2d) 129, 133 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), rev'd on other grounds,
285 U. S. 502 (1932); cf. 1 SCHNEIDER, WoaIcM's ComPENsATIoN LAw (2d ed. 1932)
§ 265; (1935) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 77.
11. To the effect that the principal purpose of a contract partly nonmaritime and partly
maritime gives color to the entire contract, cf. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v. Interlake S. S.
Co., 40 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), cert. denied 282 U. S. 845 (1930); The
Navigadora No. 73, 45 F. (2d) 639 (D. N. J. 1930); United Fruit Co. v. U. S. Shipping
Board Merchant Fleet Corp., 42 F. (2d) 222 (D. Mass. 1930).
12. There has been some doubt as to the dialectic basis of the theory of actions under
the New York statute. Doey v. Howland Co. Inc., 224 N. Y. 30, 120 N. E. 53 (1918),
cert. denied 248 U. S. 574 (1918) (contractual); Matter of Post v. Burger and Gohlke,
216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916) (constructively contractual); see Lane v. N. Y.
Industrial Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 338, 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) (remedy based on the
employer-employee relationship); see also Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict
of Laws (1927) 11 MiNN L. Ray. 329, 342-344. Under any basis, when the contract of
employment is made in New Yok and contemplates local work, the New York statute
is applicable. See Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws-Restatement
and Other Recent Developments (1935) 20 MniN. L. Rnv. 19, 27 et seq.; (1935) 44 YA=E
L. 3. 869; Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 298, 302.
13. Cf. Robinson, Legal Adjustments of Personal Injury in the Maritime Industry (1930)
44 HARv. L. REv. 223, 227-228; Note (1931) 29 Mic. L. Rav. 608. But cf. (1936) 49 Hav
L. Rav. 826.
relationship. He was a passenger under a maritime contract of transportation with
a third party ferry owner. And since the plaintiff was injured by the negligence
of the ferry owner while both were in that maritime relationship, he would seem to
have a cause of action in admiralty against the ferry owner based on the tort, which
cannot be abrogated by a state statute.14 Nor does the New York Compensation
Statute attempt to abrogate this tort action. For while the statute abrogates the
right of action in tort against a negligent employer, it does not extinguish the right
of a tort action against a negligent third party tortfeasor.Ys It does, however, provide
for the assignment of the plaintiff's cause of action in tort against the third party to
the insurance company paying the compensation.' 0 And an argument was made by
the dissent, in the instant case, on the basis of that provision. It was urged that
since neither common law nor maritime law allowed assignments of tort causes of
action,' 7 to give effect to the New York statute which provides for such an assign-
ment would prejudice the uniformity of the maritime law.' 8 This contention, how-
14. Spencer Kellog and Sons v. Hicks, 2S5 U. S. 502 (1932). That a passenger can
sue a shipowner for a tort upon navigable waters: The Moses Taylor v. Hammons, 71
U. S. 411 (1S66); see also BErocr, op. cit. supra note 9, at 99, 100.
15. N w YoRx COmPENsATION LAW (1922) § 11; ibid. (1934 Amend.) § 29. Zirpola
v. Casselman, Inc., 237 N. Y. 367, 143 N. E. 222 (1924); cf. Koppang v. Sevier, 53 P.
(2d) 455 (Mont. 1936).
This is one ground of distinction between the principal case and Spencer Kellog & Sons,
Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U. S. 502 (1932) rev'g 52 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), which afd
48 F. (2d) 311 (S. D. N. Y. 1930); noted (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 1061; (1932) 11 Toc.
L. Ray. 114. In the Hicks case, defendant employer, and not a third party tortfeas-or
as in the instant case, owned and operated the ferryboat. Although complainant was
found to be acting in the course of his employment when injured while being ferried
to work, his recovery was limited to damages in admiralty, and the state compensation
statute was held inapplicable. Because of the passenger-shipowner relationship which exL-ted
in that case, complainant had a non-abrogable right of action in tort against defendant
employer-shipowner. If recovery had been granted under the state compensation statute,
it would have abrogated the right of action in tort against defendant, which existed in
admiralty, thus prejudicing the uniformity of the maritime law. Moreover, assuming that
the statute would not have abrogated the right of action in tort, the court in the Hicks
case neither expressly nor impliedly denied complainant's right to compensation for haing
been injured in the course of his employment. It merely held that where an action in
tort was pursued, recovery for the tort would be granted.
16. NEW YORK WORRxa's CoazwEsATrox LAw (1922) § 113 (1934 Amend.) § 29.
17. North Chicago St. Rr. Co. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 49 N. E. 222 (1897); Kansas
City M. and 0. Ry. Co. v. Shutt, 24 Okla. 96, 104 Pac. 51 (1909). Travelers' Insurance
Co. v. Prince Line, Ltd., 262 Fed. 841 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
18. The dissent also contended that § 29 of the Nmv YoRE statute providing for
the assignment to the insurance carrier of a deceased employee's cause of action against a
negligent third party tortfeasor, when deceased was survived by no descendants who could
bring an action, created a new caum of action unknown to admiralty and therefore
prejudiced the uniformity of the maritime law. This contention seems to lack merit.
First: plaintiff was not killed, so that provision of the statute is not in issue. Second:
originally there was no action for wrongful death in admiralty. The Harrisburg, 119 U. S.
199 (1886). State statutes giving an action for wrongful death were always applied in
admiralty, and the instant provision is one giving a right to recover for wrongful death.
The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335 (1892); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921).
A federal statute giving a remedy for wrongful death has been enacted but it applies only
1936] NOTES 1129
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ever, is untenable. The statute does not make plaintiff's right to compensation
dependent either upon the validity of the assignment or upon the success of the
assigned cause of action.19 Furthermore, the assignment is a matter with which
admiralty can contend when the issue arises, since it may, if it wishes, deny recovery
to the assignee on the ground that a state statute cannot assign a purely maritime
cause of action.20 And even if the assignment is allowed, the argument can be
made, as it has been, that assignments of causes of action are procedural matters,
and do not affect the substantive maritime law, the uniformity of which will not
be prejudiced thereby.21
The rule of the lensen case has posed many perplexing problems. The major part
of them, however, that is, those relating to. the resolution of the substantive law
applicable to a maritime worker's right of action to recover for injuries sustained
in the course of his employment, have been settled by judicial determination2 and
by the legislative enactment of a federal longshoremen and stevedore's compensation
act.22 The question of recovery when a nonmaritime worker is injured on navigable
waters while acting pursuant to his contract of employment, is susceptible of solution
under the state compensation statutes by the use of the "local concern" doctrinal
qualification to the Jensen rule.8 Only incidental variations of fact situations yet
remain, such as the instant case which introduces the element of negligence of a
third party tortfeasor other than the employer, to which the rule of the Jensen case
might be applied and recovery under the state statute thus denied. The instant
decision is commendable in that by extending the exceptions to the Jensetn rule
it permits recovery under state compensation statutes to nonmaritime workers who
are injured in the course of their employment while being transported over navigable
waters to their place of work by third parties,23 and thus avoids an hiatus in the
desirable policy of furnishing an adequate remedy for tort claims arising out of all
industrial accidents.2 4
in the absence of a state statute. 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 761 (1928).
19. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Colon and Co., 260 N. Y. 305, 183 N. E. 506
(1932); Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Central Rr. of N. J., 143 Misc. 589, 258 N. Y. Supp.
35 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
20. Cf. The Lydia, 1 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied, Lydia S. S. Co.
v. Hugh D. MacKenzie Co., 266 U. S. 616 (1924) (cause of action for conversion held
properly assignable); Minturn v. Alexander, 5 Fed. 117 at 119 (S. D. N. Y. 1880); Cobb
v. Howard, Fed. Cas. No. 2924, p. 1133 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1856) (assignee of a chose
in action for breach of contract allowed to sue).
21. Lumber Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. of N. Y, v. Thompson, Inc., 134 Misc. 370,
235 N. Y. Supp. 646 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1929), aff'd 234 App. Div. 841, 254 N. Y.
Supp. 921 (1st Dep't 1931), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
286 U. S. 527 (1932). Contra: Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Prince Line, Ltd., 262 Fed,
841 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
22. The LONGSHOREMYn&'S AND HARBOR WORKERS COmPENsATION Acr. 44 STAT. 1424
(1927), 33 U. S. C. A. §§ 901-950 (1935 Supp.). The JoNws Aer of 1920 gave seamen the
benefit of the provisions of the EXPLOrYY's L xA iT Acr respecting railway employeeg.
41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 688 (1928). See Atbearn, The Longshorcmen'$ Act
and the Courts (1935) 23 CAur. L. R-v. 129; Comment (1934) 43 YALu, L. 3. 640.
23. Cf. the opinions of Stone, J., in Northern Coal and Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S.
142, 147-149 (1928) (concurring); Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Cook,
281 U. S. 233, 237-238 (1930) (dissenting).
24. In the instant case, if plaintiff's only recourse was held to be in admiralty, It would
be in tort against the ferry owner, who might be able to limit his liability to the value




BANK's RIGHT TO SET OFr DEPOSITS AGAINST BONDS UNDER SECrIo.[ 77 Or
BAN-RuPTcy AcT
Tn Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co., alleging that it would be
unable to pay its maturing debts among which was an interest installment and the
principal of a bond issue to fall due within the year, filed a petition for reorganization
under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. A bank, in which the railroad carried a
checking account, had purchased some of these bonds on the open market for pur-
poses of investment and held them without knowledge on the part of the railroad.
Upon notice of the filing of the petition, the bank attempted to set off deposits
of the railroad on hand at that time against the par value of these bonds. Section
77(n) provides that creditors' rights and liabilities shall be governed by the general
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act unless they are found to be inconsistent with
the provisions of Section 77.1 In a suit by the trustees to recover the deposits thus
set off, the court held that Section 68(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, which allows a
set-off in all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bank-
rupt and a creditor,2 is not inconsistent with any provision of Section 77, and
entitled the bank to make the set-off.3
It is well established that the bank has a right of set-off, often inaccurately called a
lien,4 against all moneys and funds in its possession owed to a depositor, to assure
payment of the depositor's indebtedness. This right is said to arise from an implied
contract existing from the relation of the parties.5 However, the conditions pre-
cedent to the right of set-off are that the debt to the bank be mature0 and that the
obligations be mutual and between mutual parties. Thus, the claims must arise out
of a single transaction or a series of related transactions, 7 and must be between
1. 47 STAT. 1481 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1) (1935).
"In proceedings under this section and consistent with the provisions thereof, the juris-
diction and powers of the court, the duties of the debtor and the rights and liabilities of
creditors, .and of all persons with respect to the debtor and his property, shall be the
same as if a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed and a decree of adjudication
had been entered on the day when the debtor's petition was filed."
2. 30 STAT. 565 (1S98), 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (a) (1926).
3. Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co. of Minneapolis, Minn., 11 F.
Supp. 929 (D. Minn. 1935). The case has been appealed to and argued before the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Questions have been certified to the Supreme
Court. A motion to bring up the entire record and case was denied on March second.
Orders of the Court, No. 743. U. S. L. Week Mar. 3, 1936 at 609. See also a companion
case in which it was held that the right of set-off existed but had been vaived by the bank.
Lowden v. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank, 10 F. Supp. 430 (S. D. Iowa 1935).
4. The word "lien" is inaptly applied to a general deposit in a bank, since money
deposited becomes the property of the bank itself. Bank of Maryville v. Windisch-Muhlhauser
Brewing Co., 50 Ohio St. 151, 33 N. E. 1054 (1893); see Goldstein v. Union Nat. Bank, 109
Tex. 555, 571, 213 S. W. 584, 592 (1919).
5. Jordon v. Nat. Shoe & Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467 (1378); Bank of Marysville v.
Windisch-Muhlhauser Brewing Co., 50 Ohio St. 151, 33 N. E. 1054 (1893); Gillette v. Liberty
National Bank, 95 Oki. 76, 218 Pac. 1057 (1923); see 5 Mrc=n, Bums & BA;Xm=;G (1931)
§ 114.
6. Irish v. Citizens Trust Co., 163 Fed. 880 (N. D. N. Y. 1903); Lebanon Iron Co.
v. Donnelly & Co., 29 F. (2d) 411 (E. D. Pa. 1928); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner,
219 Ala. 366, 122 So. 311 (1929).
7. See 5 Mx.c~m, BA~res & BAKiNG (1931) § 115 (c) and cases cited therein. United
States Fidelity Co. v. Woolridge, 268 U. S. 234 (1924) (in suit by bank against surety
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the parties in the same capacities.8 But, in the event of insolvency many juris-
dictions waive the requirement of maturity,0 and in a few cases where no other equities
intervene and injustice would otherwise result, also the strict requirement of
mutuality.' 0 There is nevertheless a very strong minority which denies set-off against
immature claims even in case of insolvency." In cases of bankruptcy, the bank's
right of set-off has received exceptional treatment, for in the absence of fraud or
collusion, deposits made by the bankrupt within four months of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are not recoverable as a preferential transfer,12 and can be set off against
the bankrupt's obligations even though made after the bank has knowledge of the
depositor's insolvency. L3
However, the doctrine of set-off would not seem applicable in the present case.
This was not a situation in which a creditor and the debtor have bad dealings
with each other resulting in claims both ways. The transactions giving rise to these
two claims were completely separate and unrelated both from the point of view of
time when they were incurred and of the functions which they served. The bank's
obligation to the railroad arose from deposits made in a checking account within a
on fidelity bond, set-off of payment to depositor on its bond disallowed because wholly
independent transactions). Cf. Babbit v. Read, 173 Fed. 712 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909)
(bondholder cannot set off claim on bonds against unpaid stock subscriptions); First Nat.
Bank v. Malone, 76 F. (2d) 251 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Moss v. Chitwood, 180 Ark. 600,
22 S. W. (2d) 398 (1930). See also Story's definition of mutuality. 3 Sroay, EQuITY
JURiSPRuDFxCE (14th ed. 1918) § 1871; United States Bung Manufacturing Co. v. Arm-
strong, 34 Fed. 94 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1888) (strictly applied); Scott v. Armstrong, 146
U. S. 499 (1892) (extended in case of insolvency).
8. Tobey v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 9 R. J. 236 (1869) (bank cannot set off deposit
of an executor against the debt of his testator).
9. Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S. 506 (1887); Clearwater County v. Pfeffer, 236 Fed. 183
(C. C. A. 8th, 1916) ; Sullivan v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 108 Conn. 497, 144 Ati. 34 (1928) ;
Barrios & Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 101 Cal. App. 675, 282 Pac. 386 (1929); Meinhart
v. Farmers State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 Pac. 698 (1927).
10. See Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 507 (1892); North Chicago Rolling Mill
Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596 (1894) (insolvency and non-residence held
sufficient to give right to equitable relief of set-off).
11. Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574 (1875); Appleton v. Nat. Payk Bank, 241
N. Y. 561, 150 N. E. 555 (1925); Putnam v. U. S. Trust Co., 223 Mass. 199, 111 N. B.
969 (1916); Chipman v. 9th National Bank, 120 Pa. 86, 13 Atl. 707 (1888); Kurtz v.
County Nat. Bank, 288 Pa. 472, 136 Atl. 789 (1927).
12. A deposit is said not to be a transfer as it does not operate to diminish the estate
of the depositor. New York County Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138 (1904); Studley
v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 229 U. S. 523 (1913). See Section 68 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act,
30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 108 (b) (1926).
13. New York County Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138 (1904); Continental Trust
& Savings Bank v. Chicago Title Co., 229 U. S. 435 (1913). See Section 68 (b) of
Bankruptcy Act. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 108 (b) (1926).
See Citizens' Nat. Bank of Gastonia, v. Lineberger, 45 F. (2d) 522, 529 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
But cf. Kolkman v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 27 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) (where
deposits were made by the bankrupt in order that the bank, by exercising its right of set-off,
might obtain a preferential payment, set-off was not allowed).
For general discussion see Chumbley, Bank's Right of Set-off in ,Bankruptcy (1927) 13
VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 137; Eager, Set-Off of Bank Deposit Against Indebtedness under the
Bankruptcy Act (1924) 10 VA. L. Rxv. 575.
week of filing the petition, whereas the obligation to the bank arose from bonds
in which the bank had invested its funds some three to six years previously. The
bank in thus acquiring the bonds had not extended credit directly to the depositor,
as in the case of an ordinary commercial loan, nor, presumably, had it relied on the
deposits as a means of reimbursement in case of non-payment of interest or prin-
cipal.1 4 Although the concept of "mutuality" as used in the doctrine of set-off is
extremely loose and ill-defined, it would seem to be an unwarranted extension of
its scope to hold that it applied in this case to permit a set-off in favor of the bank.
The bonds were, moreover, immature, and although set-off against an immature debt
is allowed in case of insolvency on the theory that it is accelerated by an anticipatory
breach,9 there was no evidence here that the railroad was insolvent,25 and there appears
to be no authority for holding that reorganization proceedings alone, without a specific
contractual provision in the bond, would so accelerate its maturity as to require an
immediate cash payment. It would seem, therefore, that, even if Section 68 of the
Bankruptcy Act were held to apply to the present case, the bank's right to surrender
these bonds and set them off to the extent of their face value against the debtor's
deposits should be denied.
Furthermore, an interpretation of subdivision i of Section 77 in the light of the
context and purpose of the new section should prevent the application of the doctrine
of set-off under 68a to this proceeding. The court is given exclusive jurisdiction, upon
the approval of the petition, of all the debtor's property wherever located,'0 and
may stay suits and proceedings for the enforcement of liens or mortgages until the
end of the proceeding.' 7 Upon the confirmation of the reorganization plan, the
property is to be transferred back to the debtor free of all claims except those
recognized by the plan.' s The enforcement, even though by way of self-help rather
than judicial proceedings, of the bank's claim on the bonds by the exercise of the
right of set-off may well be held inconsistent with these provisions.10  Furthermore,
the purpose of Section 77 is not liquidation and distribution of the assets of a railroad
to its creditors,20 but a reorganization, involving an equitable readjustment of its
capital structure and reduction of the claims outstanding by compromise with the
majority of the railroad's creditors 21 In fact, a narrow interpretation has been given
14. See Bank of Guntersville v. Crayter, 199 Ala. 599, 601, 75 So. 7, 8 (1917); Gibbons
v. Hecox, 105 Mich. 509, 513, 63 N. W. 519, 520 (1S95); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Yantes, 287 S. W. 505, 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Goodwin v. Barre Savings Bank &
Trust Co., 91 Vt. 228, 236, 100 Aft. 34, 37 (1917).
15. A railway need not be insolvent to come under Section 77; it is enough that it be
unable to meet its debts as they mature without any insolvency. Continental Illinois Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648 (1934).
16. 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (a) (1935). This section has been construed to include
property in the possession of a lien holder. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648 (1934).
17. Subdivision (1). 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (j) (1935).
18. Subdivision (j). 11 U. S. C A. § 205 (f) (1935).
19. The fact that a denial of the right of set-off will destroy the "lien" by depriving
the bank of its secfrity, rather than merely staying its enforcement as in the case of a
mortgage, does not change its character as a device for the collection of a debt and
therefore a remedial device which Congress has power to eliminate from the Reorganiza-
tion Act.
20. The principle of set-off under section 68 (a) fits harmoniously into the scheme of
the old Bankruptcy Act, the purpose of which was to liquidate a business. However,
railroads were, of course, expressly excluded from the old act.
21. In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 72 F. (2d) 443, 451 (C. C. A. 7th,
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by the courts to this catch-all clause of Section 7722 which incorporates other sections
of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,23 creditors who held collateral notes of the railroad
secured by its bonds were enjoined from selling the collateral under power of sale
in the notes because it would hinder, delay and obstruct the consummation of a
plan of reorganization. Under Section 77b, which carries out the same purposes for
other corporations, the courts have followed a similar policy,24 going so far as to
allow a debtor to recover property from a mortgagee who, by reason of default, had
had possession of the property for over two years previous to the filing of the petition.
26
While as a practical matter there is no particular objection to the exercise of the
right of set-off in proceedings under Section 77 when restricted to the usual commercial
credit transactions, the allowance of a set-off in the present case would seem to impede
and obstruct the reorganization, both by eliminating a considerable number of bonds
from the plan and by depriving the debtor of a large amount of necessary cash.
The decision thus seems to be not only contrary to the purposes of the Act, but
also to the tendency in the courts as expressed by the cases arising under Section
77 and 77b.
RECOVERY BY DRAWER AGAINST BANK FOR PAYMENT OF CHECK IN VIOLATION Or STOP
PAYMENT ORDER
THE defendant bank paid a check drawn upon it by a depositor after it had been
notified by the depositor to stop payment. In an action by the depositor to recover
the amount of the check thus paid and charged to his account, the bank contended
as a defense, that the depositor had received the full benefit of the payment of the
check by retaining the consideration received from the payee, and therefore had not
been damaged by the bank's unauthorized payment. On the basis of the same facts,
the bank set up a counterclaim on the theory that it was subrogated, as a purchaser
for value, to the rights of the payee of the check against the drawer. On appeal
from a Municipal Court decision for the depositor, the New York Supreme Court
reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the retention by a depositor of
1934). See President Hoover's message to the Senate and House of Representatives,
76 Cong. Rec. 1569 (1933); Speech by Representative La Guardia, 76 Cong. Rec. 2923
(1933); see also Billig, Corporate Reorganization (1933) 17 MInN. L. Rav. 237, 244.
22. Subdivision (n) of Railway Reorganization Act. 47 STAT. 1480 (1933), 11 U. S.
C. A. § 205 (e) (1935); same clause in Corporate Reorganization Act, 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 207 (o) (1935).
23. 294 U. S. 648 (1934).
24. Where a lease held by the debtor provided for termination upon the insolvency
or the appointment of a receiver for the lessee, the petition of the landlord under section
77B for leave to sue the debtor in ejectment or for an oIder to turn over possession of
the premises was denied without prejudice, because possession was necessary to the business
existence of the debtor. In re Penn Victor Dairies, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 126 (E. D. Pa. 1935).
It has been held by the District Coult of the Southern District of California that the
seller in a conditional sales agreement may be enjoined from retaking his property where
the buyer is in process of reorganization under Section 77B. In re White Truck & Transfer
Co. (unreported, decided Sept. 4, 1934); cf. In re Burgemeister Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp.
902 (S. D. Ill. 1935). Contra: In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 237 (S. D. N. Y.
1935).
25. Grand Boulevard Investment Co. v. Strauss, 78 F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
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the full consideration received for a check after knowledge of payment by the
bank, would operate as a ratification of the unauthorized payment. In stating
that the depositor was entitled to prove a partial failure of consideration on
the new trial, the court seems to suggest by implication that such proof would
destroy the bank's defense and entitle the depositor to recover against the bank
to the full extent of the wrongful payment.1 One justice dissented on the ground
that the bank could not justify its unauthorized payment by showing that such
payment discharged a just debt owing by the depositor to the payee.
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, which adopts the rule that a
check does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds credited by the
bank to the drawer's account,2 a check is merely an order from the depositor,
as principal, to the bank, as agent, to pay in accordance with the implied contract
between them.3 And it is settled that the drawer of a check may countermand
the order therein contained, or stop payment, by notice to the drawee bank at any
time before the bank has either paid the check or obligated itself by certification.4
Such stopping of payment does not affect the drawer's liability to a holder of the
check, but merely operates as dishonor and notice, and thus makes unconditional
the drawer's liability to the holder.5 If, however, the bank pays the check in
violation of a timely and sufficient stop order received from the drawer, it does
so at its peril. The bank cannot then recover the amount from the recipient payee
or holder, as a payment mistakenly made, for there is no privity between the bank
and the holder, and common-law rules of mistake have no application to the payment
1. Woodmere Cedarhurst Corp. v. National City Bank of New York, 234 N. Y. Supp.
238 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1935). Since the depositor was victorious below and took no
appeal from the lower court's ruling that plaintiff's proffered evidence of partial failure of
consideration was inadmissible, the appellate court's reversal and ordering of a new trial
on the ground of error in that ruling is apparently anomalous. This is pointed out by the
dissent. The anomaly is perhaps only apparent, however. Having overruled the lower
court's ruling of law that the bank could not set up as a defense the depositor's receipt
and retention of consideration from the payee of the check, and being apparently of the
opinion that the bank had established its defense so far as the record then showed, the
appellate court seemingly felt that the depositor should be allowed to rebut that defene,
if possible, by proof of partial or total failure of consideration. Since the lower court
had prevented the depositor from introducing such proof into the record, a new trial was
the only fair solution.
Although the appellate court did not pass on the merits of the bank's counterclaim, it
suggested that if the bank "could be said to have the right to recover" thereon, the depozitor
would here again be entitled to a new trial to introduce evidence of partial failure of
consideration.
2. NFGo=A.rx I-srnuamrz's LAW § 189.
3. See Ozburn v. Corn Exch. Nat. Bank, 203 I1. App. 155, 157 (1917).
4. People's Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacey, 146 Ala. 688, 40 So. 346 (1905); Ozburn
v. Corn Exch. Nat. Bank, 208 Ill. App. 155 (1917); First Nat. Bank v. School District,
31 Okla. 139, 120 Pac. 614 (1912); Hewitt v. First Nat. Bank, 113 Tea. 100, 252 S. W.
161 (1923); see BIGFrow, BimLs, NorS, AN Cnacrs (3d ed. 1928) § 209.
As to questions of the sufficiency of the stop order. time of receipt, etc., see Moore,
Sussman and Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment
of Checks-I. Legal Method (1933) 42 YA=n L. 3. 817.
5. Rogers Park Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 233 Ill. App. 99 (1924); Anderson v. Elem,
111 Kan. 713, 203 Pac. 573 (1922); Flynn v. Cu'rie, 130 Ale. 461, 157 AUt. 310 (1931);
Bond v. Krugg, 115 Okla. 222, 242 Pac. 559 (1925).
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of negotiable paper.6 Furthermore, the bank cannot charge the amount of the
check to the account of the drawer, for the latter may recover that amount from
the bank if it is so charged. 7
In such a suit by the drawer against the bank, assuming that the drawer has a
good defense on the check against the payee or holder to whom payment was made,
it seems that the bank should be held liable for the amount of the unauthorized pay-
ment, for the drawer would not have been liable to the payee or holder upon the
bank's refusal to pay in compliance with his stop order. On the other, hand, assuming
that the drawer has no defense against the payee or holder, he then would have
been liable on the check even if the bank had complied with his stop order. In
such case, he should not be able to recover from the bank the amount of the
payment; having merely discharged his debt, the payment has caused the depositor
no damage. The inquiry in such a suit, therefore, should be directed to the
question of whether or not the drawer had a good defense on the check against the
payee or holder to whom the bank made payment. And it is arguable that the
drawer should have the burden of proving loss by reason of the payment, since the
facts are most likely to be in his possession and since any other rule might result
in unearned enrichment of the drawer, and a consequently excessive liability of the
bank.8
But, generally, no such proof has been required of the drawer, and the bank has
not been allowed to justify its payment even by assuming the burden of proving
that the drawer retained the consideration received for the check or by otherwise
showing that the recipient was justly entitled to the payment.' 0 The reason given
for this rule is that to allow the bank to defend on such grounds would permit the
bank to exercise its own judgment as to the liability of the drawer to the holder and
to try the question of that liability in an action between the drawer and the bank.11
6. Bank of Moulton v. Rankin, 24 Ala. App. 110, 131 So. 450, cert. denied, 222 Ala.
188, 131 So. 454 (1930) (suit against payee) ; National Bank v. Berrall, 70 N. J. Law 757,
58 Atl. 189 (1904) (holder in due course); Huffman v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 10 S. W. (2d)
753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (payee). Contra: National Loan & Exch. Bank v. Lachowltz,
131 S. C. 432, 128 S. E. 10 (1925). See BIGELow, op. cit. supra note 4, § 209, n. 4, criti-
cizing the latter case.
7. People's Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacey; Ozburn v. Corn Exch. Nat. Bank; First
Nat. Bank v. School District; Hewitt v. First Nat. Bank, all sutpra note 4. However,
a bank may limit its liability in this respect by contract with its depositor. Tremont Trust
Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920); Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y.
152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929).
8. This has been done in at least one jurisdiction, the suit being treated as an action
for damages and the drawer being denied recovery because he was unable to prove a defense
on the check against the person who received payment. Sutter v. Security Trust Co.,
95 N. J. Eq. 44, 122 AtI. 381 (Ch. 1923), aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq. 644, 126 Atl. 435 (1924).
9. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926); Schoen v.
Security Bank of N. Y., 81 N. Y. Misc. 173, 142 N. Y. Supp. 309 (Sup. Ct., App. Term,
1913); Stag Co. v. Union Bank, 201 fll. App. 510 (1916) semble.
10. American Defense Society, Inc. v. Sherman Nat. Bank, 225 N. Y. 506, 122 N. E. 695
(1919); Paino Bros., Inc. v. Central Nat. Bank, 242 App. Div. 845, 275 N. Y. Supp, 169
(2d Dep't, 1934); Wall v. Franklin Trust Co., 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392 (1924).
11. See Wall v. Franklin Trust Co., 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392, 395 (1924). It seems
unlikely, however, that a bank would choose to take the 'isk of exercising its own judg-
ment as to the drawer's liability to the holder. Also, business policy would prevent a
bank from antagonizing its customers by willfully violating orders to stop payment. Prac-
tically all such violations in the cases are the result of negligence o" misunderstanding,
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However, a contrary result has been achieved indirectly in at least one jurisdiction
by first permitting the drawer to recover the amount of the unauthorized payment
from the bank, and then, on a theory of subrogation, allowing the bank, as a
purchaser for value, to enforce against the drawer whatever rights the holder may
have had on the check;"- and it seems that the bank's rights should in such a
jurisdiction be assertable in a counterclaim to the drawer's action.13
In the instant case the court refrained from passing upon the bank's right to
counterclaim, but was willing to hold in favor of the bank on the theory of rati-
fication by the drawer where the bank could show that the drawer had received and
retained the entire, and not merely part, of the consideration for the check-the
implication being, however, that proof of any failure of consideration would entitle
the drawer to recover the entire wrongful payment from the bank. Thus the result
of the decision is that the drawer can recover nothing from the bank if he has
suffered no damage whatsoever from the unauthorized payment, but can recover
the entire amount of the payment if he can show even slight damage. In view of
the fact that most payments in violation of stop orders are the result of negligence,
this result seems inequitable, for it may permit the drawer to recover an amount greater
than the loss the bank's mistake has caused him. Moreover, the doctrine of rati-
fication is properly applicable in favor of the bank as a separate defense only
where the drawer is shown to have directly recognized or adopted the unauthorized
payment as his own,' 4 and not where, as in the instant case, he has merely retained
the consideration paid by the payee. It would seem, therefore, that the bank should
be allowed the defense of ratification only in the former situation; but if it fails
to sustain that defense, it should be allowed to counterclaim 3 as a subrogee to the
rights of the last holder against the drawer. For if it is once established that the
bank's payment was unauthorized and unratified, then the check has not been dis-
charged by a payment by the drawer or by anyone rightfully acting for him, and
the bank, having paid out its own money, is a purchaser for value. This method
conforms with the theory that a bank does not reduce its obligation to a depositor
by making unauthorized payments,l 5 and it also limits the bank's ultimate liability
to the amount of the actual loss which it has caused the depositor.
12. Usher v. A. S. Tucker Co., 217 Mass. 441, 105 N. E. 360 (1914), L. R. A. 1916 F,
826; see BiGELow, op. cit. supra note 4, § 209, n. 4; Bvuumm;, NzcoLnrX It;smum=r
Lvw (5th ed. 1932) 822.
13. However, this has not been settled, and the New York cases are inconclusive either
way. In favor of allowing the counterclaim, see Schneider v. Irving Bank, 30 How. Pr.
190, 192 (N. Y. 1S65); K. & K. Silk Trimming Co. v. Garfield Nat. Bank, 127 N. Y.
Misc. 27, 31, 215 N. Y. Supp. 269, 273 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (concurring opinion of Bijur, J.,
as to note payable at bank); Dousmanis v. Colonial Bank, 134 N. Y. Misc. 472, 235
N. Y. Supp. 4S9 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 228 App. Div. 809, 240 N. Y. Supp. 874 (let
Dep't, 1930). But see Egerton v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 43 How. Pr. 216, 218 (N. Y. 1872);
and the opinion of Churchill, J., in K. & K. Silk Trimming Co. v. Garfield Nat. Bank, supra.
14. Thompson v. Republic Trust Co., 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 183 (1924) (long acquiescence
in an account rendered by the bank); see American Defense Soc., Inc. v. Sherman Nat.
Bank, 225 N. Y. 506, 509, 122 N. E. 695 (1919) (crediting payment against debt payable
on books of drawer); Pease & Dwyer Co. v. State Nat. Bank, 114 Tenn. 693, 699, 8
S. W. 172, 173 (1905) (suit by drawer against payee to recover proceeds); Reade v. Royal
Bank of Ireland, [19221 2 Ir. Rep. 22, 26, 11 Brit. Rul. Cas. 1086 (same).
15. See Moore, etc., op. cit. supra note 4, at 837, 840.
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MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SALE OF COR-
POnATE BONDS
ABOUT 1926 the claimant purchased from S. W. Straus & Co., as an investment,
$5,500 worth of bonds secured by second and leasehold mortgages on New York prop-
erties, relying upon fraudulent misrepresentations of the seller that the bonds were
secured by first mortgages. The claimant discovered the fraud upon the appoint-
ment of a receiver for the seller on March 3, 1933, and thereupon filed with the
receiver a claim in deceit for damages measured by the difference between the price
paid and the value of the bonds at the time of the discovery of the fraud, alleging
the value at that time to be about $500. The court, fearing that to grant damages
based on such depressed market values would enable the investor to profit from future
market gains, dismissed the claim on the ground that under the tort rule of damages
as applied in New York' the proper measure of damages was the difference between
the price paid and the actual value of the investment at the time of sale, rather
than at the time of discovery and that there was no evidence upon which to compute
the damage on this basis.2
The tort rules for measuring damages in actions for fraudulent misrepresentation in
the sale of corporate securities allows the investor to recover only such loss as is the
proximate result of the fraud, or the difference between the price paid and the actual
value of the security received. It is usually stated that this value is to be determined
at the time of sale4 by reference to the market price at that time.5 But the market
price at the time of sale, though accurate in cases involving tangible property, does
not necessarily measure the actual value of corporate securities, for widely broadcast
fraudulent statements may have kept the market price at such an artificial level that its
use will deny the investor any recovery.0  Since most of the reported cases involve
1. Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919).
2. People v. S. W. Straus & Co., Inc.; Feltham v. Schultze, 282 N. Y. Supp. 972 (Sup.
Ct. 1935). About 1,300 similar claims were filed against the receiver by the bondholders,
but most claimants elected to rescind and claim the consideration paid.
3. The tort rule is applied by the federal courts, and by a sizeable minority of the
state courts. Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125 (1889); Cramer v. Overfield, 115 Ran. 580,
223 Pac. 1100 (1924); Otis & Co. v. Teal, 74 Colo. 336, 221 Pac. 884 (1923), Smith v.
Martin, 93 Vt. 111, 106 AUt. 666 (1919); Garstang v. Skinner, 165 Cal. 721, 134 Pac.
329 (1913); Beckwith v. Powers, 157 S. W. 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Van do Wide
v. Garbade, 60 Ore. 585, 120 Pac. 752 (1912); Freeman v. F. P. Harbaugh & Co., 114
Minn. 283, 130 N. W. 1110 (1911). The English courts apply the tort rule. Peek v Dferry,
37 Ch. D. 541 (1887), rev'd on other grounds, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). But a
majority of the state courts use the contract warranty rule, which gives the investor
the benefit of his bargain, or the difference between the price paid and the value of the
article as represented. See cases collected in note (1928) 57 A. L. R. 1142. For critical com-
parisons of the two rules, see Comment (1920) 5 CoRN. L. Q. 167; (1926) 35 YALE
L. J. 757; (1921) 6 IOWA L. BuLL. 242; HARPER, LAW or ToRrs (1933) § 226.
4. Garstang v. Skinner, 165 Cal. 721, 134 Pac. 329 (1913); Whitney v. Lynch, 222
Mass. 112, 109 N. E. 826 (1915).
S. See Cartwright v. Hughes, 226 Ala. 464, 467, 147 So. 399, 401 (1933).
6. Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928); Hindman
v. First National Bank of Louisville, 112 Fed. 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902); Peek v. Derry,
37 Ch. D. 541, 593 (1887); Shwab v. Walters, 147 Tenn. 638, 251 S. W. 42 (1923);
Whiting v. Price, 172 Mass. 240, 51 N. E. 1084 (1898). For an analysis of the factual
distinctions between tangibles and securities in this respect, see Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 227, 229.
wholesale schemes which inflate the market price, the courts, in ascertaining the actual
value of the securities, have usually looked to "intrinsic" or "real" value, consider-
iag such factors as corporate worth and earning power in the case of stocks,7 and
the value of the property pledged as security in the case of bonds.8  While "intrinsic"
value at the time of sale may satisfactorily determine the immediate loss to the
investor upon receipt of the securities, in the usual case the securities are held for
some time after the sale, so that the investor may suffer additional loss due to their
subsequent decline in value. Although this decline may have been caused by factors
independent of the fraud, such as inherent weaknesses in the securities or economic
depression, nevertheless, if the securities were recommended for purposes of investment,
and the fraud induced the investor to hold them while they declined in value, the fraud
may properly be said to be the proximate cause of the investor's loss. In an effort
to include this element of loss the courts have employed two devices. Some courts,
although adhering to the fiction that they were measuring value at the time of sale,
have examined the subsequent history of the securities as bearing on this value, and
have thus allowed the investor to recover for depreciation occurring subsequent to the
sale.9 Other courts have obtained the same result by disregarding the value of the
securities at the time of sale, and using instead the value at the time of the discovery
of the fraud by the investor, on the theory that as long as the fraud remained un-
discovered it continued to influence the investor to hold the securities, and, there-
fore, all loss caused the investor by decline in value up to the time of discovery was
the proximate result of the fraud.' 0 Although it has been suggested that the use of
these methods may result in holding the seller liable for depreciation due to economic
causes independent of the fraud,1' this result has probably been avoided in cases
thus far decided on the point. For damages have been computed in this manner only
when the misrepresentation might have been expected to lull the investor into security
by exaggerating the amount of the assets,' 2 or when there was evidence of repeated
misrepresentations intentionally made to prevent the investor from selling.1"  Con-
7. Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125 (1889); Hindman v. First National Bank of Louis-
ville, 112 Fed. 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902), cert. denied, 186 U. S. 433 (1903); Beckwith v.
Powers, 157 S. W. 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). See also Graetz v. Smith, 125 Misc. 836,
837, 211 N. Y. Supp. 577, 578 (2d Dep't 1924).
8. Davidge v. Guardian Trust Co., 136 App. Div. 78, 120 N. Y. Supp. 628 (3d Dcp't
1909); Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. B. 870 (1928); c. Carter v.
Turner, 131 Cal. App. 296, 21 P. (2d) 139 (1933).
9. Hindman v. First National Bank of Louisville, 112 Fed. 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902);
Freeman v. F. P. Harbaugh & Co., 114 Minn. 283, 130 N. IV. 1110 (1911); Davis v.
Coshnear, 129 Mle. 334, 151 A. 725 (1930); Cramer v. Overficld, 115 Kan. 580, 223
Pac. 1100 (1924) (contract-warranty 'ule); Whiting v. Price, 172 Mass. 240, 51 N. E.
1084 (1898) (contract-warranty rule). See also Garstang v. Skinner, 165 Cal. 721,
726, 134 Pac. 329, 331 (1913). Cf. Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 84, 159
N. E. 870 (1928).
10. Duffy v. Smith, 57 N. J. L. 679, 32 AUt. 371 (1895); Goodin v. Wilbur, 104 IlL
App. 45 (1902); Munson v. Fishburn, 183 Cal. 206, 190 Pac. 803 (1920); Southern Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Wales, 24 Ala. App. 542, 138 So. 553 (1931); Cartwright v. Hughes,
226 Ala. 464, 147 So. 399 (1933); cf. Otis & Co. v. Teal, 74 Colo. 336, 221 Pac. 834
(1923).
11. See Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 84, 92, 159 N. E. 870, 873 (1928).
12. See cases cited supra notes 9 and 10. Cf. Continental Insurance Co. v. Merca-
dante, 222 App. Div. 181, 225 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1st Dep't 1927).
13. Singleton v. Harriman, 152 Misc. 323, 272 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1933), afjd
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fined to such cases, these methods would seem to determine satisfactorily the proxi-
mate result of the fraud.14
In the principal case, the claimant contended that the New York Court of Appeals,
by its decision in Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co.,' 5 had adopted the rule that the time
of discovery of the fraud should be used for measuring value in all cases in which
securities are purchased for investment. In that case, a bond, recommended by in.
vestment bankers as an investment, was purchased on their fraudulent exaggeration
of the amount of the assets securing it; and held without discovery of the fraud until
liquidation. The court, pointing out that the loss resulted because the weakness of the
company had been concealed from the investor, allowed recovery of the difference
between the price paid and the amount received on liquidation as a distributive share.
Since there the court stressed the fact that the concealed weakness induced the in-
vestor to hold the bond, the decision would not seem to be authority for allowing
recovery at the time of discovery except when the misrepresentation was shown to
have a similar effect. It is possible that in the principal case the investor, thinking
that he held first mortgage bonds rather than second, may have been induced to hold
them in spite of the economic decline. However, because of the difference between
the character of the representations in the two cases, the conclusion reached by
the court in the principal case may be justified.10 But a better method for com-
puting the loss due to the fraud was available. Since the claimant was sold second
mortgage bonds in place of first mortgage bonds, it would have been possible to deter-
mine the exact amount of the loss due to the fraudulent substitution, including such
loss as was caused by retention of the bonds until time of discovery, by allowing the
claimant to recover the difference between the value of the second mortgage bonds
and the first mortgage bonds at the time of discovery.' 7 This would eliminate any
possibility of unjustly holding the seller liable for losses due to economic causes.
DEDUCTION OF UNCOLLECTIBLE CLAIMS FROM GROSS ESTATE IN COMPUTING
ESTATE TAX
THE decedent left assets amounting to $184,110.01 and claims against his estate
equal to $283,148.77. Funeral and administration expenses were estimated at
$52,935.58, rendering the estate insolvent to the extent of $151,974.34. However,
proceeds from life insurance policies taken out by the insured, payable to beneficiaries
without opinion, 241 App. Div. 857, 271 N. Y. Supp. 996 (1st Dep't 1934). Cf. O'Hara
v. Derschug, 241 App. Div. 513, 272 N. Y. Supp. 189 (4th Dep't 1934).
14. See Note (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 631.
15. 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928), noted in (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 504.
16. The court in the principal case attempted to limit the rule of the Hotaling case to a
situation where the bond had been cancelled and where it would thus no longer be poml-
ble for the investor to recover damages from the seller and then recoup his loss upon
a rise in the market. This reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that on discovery of
the fraud the investor has the option to rescind and return the bond, or to sell the bond,
or to hold it, and when he elects to pursue the latter course he, in effect, elects to accept
any future gain or loss, just as though he had reinvested the proceeds after rescinding
or selling.
17. It should be no objection that this method, in effect, adopts the contract-warranty
rule applied as of the time of discovery of the fraud. Cf. Bank of Atchison County v.
Byers, 139 Mo. 627, 41 S. W. 325 (1897). See Green, Deceit (1930) 16 VA. L, REv. 749,




other than the executors of the estate, yielded $372,385.49, and, although free from
claims of creditors of the decedent,' this sum, except for a $40,000 exemption, was
required to be included in the gross estate for the purpose of computing the estate
tax.2 The State Tax Commission sought to subject the total value of the proceeds
received by the beneficiaries in excess of $40,000 to the estate tax, contending that,
in computing the net estate subject to the tax, claims should be deducted from the
gross estate only to the extent that they could actually be collected; that is, only
an amount equal to the actual assets of the estate, exclusive of insurance proceeds
which could not be reached by creditors, should be deducted. However, the Surro-
gate Court for Kings County ruled that, even though it was evident that only a
fractional part of the claims could be collected, nevertheless since the statute did
not distinguish between claims paid in full and those only a portion of which could
be collected,3 the executors were entitled to deduct the face value of all claims, thus
making the net estate subject to the tax only $180,411.15.4
Such an interpretation seems unnecessarily technical and probably contrary to
the intention of the legislature. Although the tax in the instant case is called and
1. See VAncE, IsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930) § 147. Formerly creditors in New York were
given a statutory right to reach such proceeds. N. Y. Dorsra RxrrTIoNs IAw (1909)
§ 52; Kittel v. Domeyer, 175 N. Y. 205, 67 N. E. 433 (1903); Guardian Trust Co. v.
Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 23 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1st Dep't 1910), alffd, 201 N. Y. 546,
95 N. E. 1129 (1911). At present the beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds and avails
free from the claims of the insured's creditors regardless of whether the power to change
the beneficiary is reserved. N. Y. INs. LAw (1927) § 55-a; In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d)
158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 355 (1929); Chatham Phenix Nat. Bank
& T. Co. v. Crosney, 251 N. Y. 189, 167 N. E. 217 (1929); see Comment (1934) 4
BRo0Lvx L. Rrv. 57.
2. The New York Tax Law provides that proceeds from life insurance policies payable
to persons other than the executors or administrators of the estate shall be included in the
gross estate to the extent that such proceeds are required to be included in the groE3
estate under the federal estate tax. N. Y. TAX LAw (1930) § 249-r (9), as amended N.
Y. TAX LAW (1931) § 249-r. The federal estate tax requires such proceeds in exces of
$40,000 to be included in the gross estate. 44 Smx. 70, 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 411-g
(1935). The Treasury Department has ruled that proceeds are to be included in the gross
estate only if the decedent at the time of his death possesed some legal incident of owner-
ship in the policy. U. S. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 27, 3 C. C. H. Fed. Tax Service (1936) §
2060. As to what is included in the term "legal incidents of ownership," see U. S. Treas.
Reg. 80, Art. 25, 3 C. C. H. Fed. Tax Service (1936) § 2058. For a collection of provi-
sions in other state statutes subjecting life insurance proceeds to death taxes see Cr.tan,
hiHE rANcE AND EsTAm TAX.Es O LwE INsua xcz (1935) 203-227.
3. N. Y. TAX LAW (1930) § 249-S(1).
4. In re Suderov's Estate, 156 Misc. 661, 282 N. Y. Supp. 405 (Surr. Ct. 1935). Thus
the net estate is approximately fifty per sent less than it would have been had the conten-
tion of the State Tax Commission been sustained:
Assets of the estate $184,110.01
Life insurance proceeds
less $40,000 exemption $332,385.49
Gross Estate $516,495.50 Gross estate $516,495.50
Valid claims plus funeral and Collectible claims plus funeral
administration expenses $336,084.35 and administration expmses $184,110.01
Net estate $180,411.15 $332,385.49
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has been held an estate tax,0 it has certain characteristics of an inheritance tax.
Chief among these is the provision requiring the executor to apportion the tax among
the various persons interested in the estate.0 Even where property included in the
gross estate never comes into the possession of the executor, such as gifts in con-
templation of death, gifts to take effect on death, and proceeds from life insurance
policies as in the instant case, the executor is required to collect from the recipients
of such property their proportionate share of the tax based upon the ratio between
the value of the property received and the net estate subject to the tax, Thus in the
instant case the beneficiaries of the insurance policies are liable for the entire tax,
for they are the only persons interested in the estate within the meaning of the statute.
Since the amount they receive is in no way affected by claims against the estate,
there seems to be no sound reason why the value of the claims in excess of the assets
of the estate should be deducted from the proceeds of the policies in determining
the amount of the tax for which the beneficiaries are liable. The instant case renders
it possible for the beneficiaries to escape taxation altogether, should claims against
the estate exceed not only the assets of the estate, but also the statutory gross estite
including life insurance proceeds. Moreover, such a construction of the statute
might encourage tax avoidance. For, by investing the bulk of one's assets in life
insurance, not only would creditors of the decedent be unable to reach the proceeds
of such policies in case of subsequent insolvency, but, in addition, the beneficiaries
could take advantage of uncollectible claims in reducing the amount of the estate tax.
Although the statute does not expressly limit deductions from the gross estate to
claims which can actually be deducted, it does provide that only those claims which
have been contracted in good faith for a full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth may be deducted.7 That the legislature intended to limit deductions
to such bona fide claims as were actually paid and which thereby reduced the amount
of property transferred to persons interested in the estate, would seem a fair inter-
pretation of the statute. In a somewhat analogous situation under similar statutes
it has been held that, where the decedent makes special provision for a claimant in
his will, and the claimant chooses to take under the will rather than enforce his claim,
the executor is not entitled to deduct the claim from the gross estate.8 If valid
claims voluntarily waived may not be deducted, it is arguable that valid claims, only
5. N. Y. TAx LAW (1930) § 249-n. In re Weiden's Estate, 144 Misc. 854, 856, 259
N. Y. Supp. 573 (Surfr. Ct. 1932); In re Meade's Estate, 145 Misc. 893, 895, 261 N. Y.
Supp. 328 (Surr. Ct. 1932); In Te Leichtman's Estate, 147 Misc. 589, 594, 265 N, Y. Supp,
617 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
6. X. Y. DEcEDFaT's EsTAm LAW (1930) § 124; N. Y. TAX LAW (1930) 249-n.
"Persons interested in the estate" is defined as including all persons entitled to receive
or who have received any property or interest required to be included in the gross estate,
N.. Y. TAx LAW (1930) § 249-in (g). A similar provision is found in the federal
estate tax. 44 STAT. 79, 80 (1926), as amended, 47 STAT. 280 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A.
§§ 426 (c), 427 (b) (1935).
7. N. Y. TAX LAw (1930) § 249-s(l). This provision is substantially the same as the
corresponding provision of the federal estate tax. 44 STAT. 72 (1926) as amended, 47
STAT. 280 (1932), 48 STAT. 753 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 412 (b) (1935). The federal
estate tax has been constantly amended in an effort to restrict the type of claims which
may be deducted. Cf. 42 STAT. 279 (1921) (claims against the estate); 43 STAT. 305
(1924) (claims contracted in good faith for a fair consideration in money or money's
worth).
8. Jacobs v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 34 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929);
see (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 132; (1930) 39 YALE L. 3. 436.
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a portion of which can be collected because of insolvency, should be deducted only
to the extent that they actually diminish the estate.
However, it may be argued that the result reached in the instant case is justified
in view of. the rule that tax statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the tax-
payer and should not be extended by implication beyond their literal meaning.0 More-
over, in the instant case, the statute imposes an estate tax measured in part by the
value of property which did not belong to the decedent at his death.10 Until com-
paratively recently it was considered doubtful whether the proceeds of life insurance
policies payable to persons other than the executor of the estate could be constitution-
ally required to be included in the gross estate for the purpose of computing death
taxes." Although it is no longer open to question that an estate tax may be measured
by such proceeds where the insured retains the power to change the beneficiary, '
courts are especially likely to construe such a statutory provision strictly against the
government.
Furthermore, the legislature presumably required life insurance proceeds to be
included in the statutory gross estate so that the New York estate tax would conform
to the federal estate tax,13 thereby securing for New York the utmost advantage of
the eighty per cent credit allowed the estate under the federal tax for death taxes
paid under state laws.' 4 Consequently it would seem desirable for the New York
and federal statutes to receive a uniform interpretation.' 0 Thus, since under the
federal statute the estate has been held entitled to deduct the full amount of all valid
claims regardless of whether they can be collected,16 it may be argued that the same
rule should be applicable to the state tam
9. See In re Vassar's Estate, 127 N. Y. 1, 12, 27 N. E. 394 (1891); In re Wadsworth's
Estate, 100 Mlisc. 439, 442, 166 N. Y. Supp. 716, 718 (Surr. Ct. 1917); In re Gates' Estate,
243 N. Y. 193, 198, 153 N. E. 45 (1926).
10. See In re Meade's Estate, 145 Mlisc. 893, 896, 261 N. Y. Supp. 328, 330 (Surr. Ct.
1932), where it is stated that an estate tax should be computed in the particular manner
provided, by statute, without regard to the amount of property received by individuals.
11. Tyler v. Treasurer, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917); In re Voorhe&s Estate,
200 App. Div. 259, 193 N. Y. Supp. 168 (3d Dep't 1922); In re Haedrich's Estate, 134
Misc. 741, 236 N. Y. Supp. 395 (Surr. CL 1929); see CLAR, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13;
GLrAsor AND Oris, IxnnarmAacE TA.'cATioN 419 f; V ~cE, Is;SURAIcn § 159.
12. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929); John E. McKelvy
Exec., 31 B. T. A. 1206 (1935). But where the rights of the beneficiaries are completely
vested, the proceeds are probably not subject to the tax. Frick v. Lewellyn, 293 Fed.
803 (W. D. Pa. 1924), aff'd on other grounds, 268 U. S. 238 (1925); Contra: In re
Allis' Will, 174 Wis. 527, 184 N. W. 381 (1921). See CLARE, op. cit. supra note 2, §9 18-23;
Davis, Taxation of Interest in Insurance (1930) 10 B. U. L. Rxv. 138; Note (1929) 15
VA. L. Ray. 777.
13. See GRAoGE, STAuB, and BLArc0roRD, WIL.rs, ExECuTOnS, Alm Tausrrs (1933)
713; Legis. (1931) 2 Fiduciary L. Chron. 81; In re Leichtman's Estate, 147 Disc. 589,
592, 265 N. Y. Supp. 617, 622 (Surr. Ct. 1933). And see note 1, supra.
14. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 413(b) (1935).
15. Cf. In re Weiden's Estate, 263 N. Y. 107, 188 N. E. 270 (1933), where, for the
sake of uniformity in administration, the inclusion of estates by the entirety in the gros_
estate was held constitutional because a similar provision in the federal statute had buen
upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
16. Commissioner of Internal Rev. v. Strauss, 77 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935);
United Guardian Trust Co, Adm'r, 32 B. T. A., July 19, 1935.
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LIABILITY Or BANK TO DEPOSITOR WHEN EMPLOYEES OF BOTH CONSPIRE TO Diwv1r
FUNDS
E, THE employee of a corporation, conspired with W, the cashier of a bank at
which the corporation kept a deposit account, to divert the proceeds of checks
entrusted by the corporation to E for deposit in the bank. E, instead of delivering
the checks to the teller of the bank, handed them, with a deposit slip made out
in E's name, directly to W, who placed them in the "block" department of the bank
in such a way that no other employee of the bank could have discovered the dis-
crepancy between the special endorsement of the checks and the account to which
they were credited. From March, 1931, the time of the first deposit, to March, 1932,
$50,000 was collected by the bank on checks endorsed by the corporation to the
bank and deposited in this way and was credited to E's account and drawn out by
him. E was able to conceal the diversion from his employer because he was also
responsible for checking the monthly statements sent by the bank. And althougb
the president of the plaintiff corporation discovered the diversions in March, 1932,
he kept the knowledge to himself, apparently fearing that a suit by the corporation
against the bank to recover the loss would result in the bank's demand for payment
on a debt owed by the president personally to the bank. As a result, the bank
was first given notice of the diversions when, following the death of its president,
the corporation brought suit against the bank for the full amount of the checks
in September, 1932. The New York Supreme Court gave judgment for the plaintiff
on the ground that the bank was under an absolute duty to pay to its depositor the
proceeds of checks collected by it.1  This judgment was reversed by the Court
of Appeals, which held that the bank was entitled to set off against its obligation
to the depositor, the damage, equal to the entire amount of its obligation, caused
it by the depositor's failure to fulfill its duty to check the bank statements and
report to the bank any discrepancies thus discoverable. The fact that the task of
inspection of the bank's statements had been delegated to a dishonest employee was
held not to excuse the depositor's failure to meet the requirement mentioned.2 The
Court pointed out that, even in the absence of such a duty on the part of the
depositor to give notice, it would certainly be liable for damages caused by its failure
1. Affirmed without opinion, Potts & Co. v. Lafayette Nat. Bank, 243 App. Div. 765,
278 N. Y. Supp. 535 (1st Dept. 1935).
2. Potts & Co. v. Lafayette Nat. Bank, 269 N. Y. 181, 199 N. E. 50 (1935); reheaing
denied, 269 N. Y. 569, 199 N. E. 697 (1935). The failure of the depositor to give notice
was held to have damaged the bank both by prejudicing its right to indemnity against its
surety, which had meanwhile become insolvent, and by enabling the two dishonest employees
to continue their fraud.
An aspect of this case which is not present in the usual case in which either an innocent bank
or an innocent depositor must bear the loss occasioned by the dishonesty of an agent is that here
two agents, one of a bank, one of a depositor, conspired together to accomplish the diversion.
The application of the rules concerning the imputation of the knowledge of a dishonest agent to
his principal under these circumstances results in a reductio ad absurdum, and demonstrates the
necessity of deciding the case without reference to agency rules. Where the failure of a dis-
honest agent to act upon knowledge results in a violation of a principal's contractual or
relational duty to a third party, the principal is affected with this knowledge. RESTATE-
MINT, AGENCY (1933) § 282(2)a. But notice to an agent is not notice to his principal
where the third party has notice of the agent's adverse interest, Id. § 271. Both of these
rules may be applied to each party in the instant case, with the result that each principal
is affected with his agent's knowledge, but at the same time is not affected by the notice
which conveys this knowledge.
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to give notice until September, 1932, of the knowledge obtained by its president
in March, 1932, and which would be imputed to the corporation as principal.
The deposit of funds in a bank creates a duty on the part of the bank to repay
the amount of the deposit to the depositor or his order.3 Notice of the account to
which the deposit of checks is to be credited is ordinarily given to the bank in
two ways, by a deposit slip and by a special indorsement on the checks. Since
in the instant case the deposit slip was made out in the name of the corporation's
dishonest agent, it could convey no notice to the bank as to the true owner of the
checks. However, the special endorsement of the checks deposited by this agent was
held to be notice sufficient to impose a duty on the bank to pay their proceeds only
to the order of the depositor who endorsed them, in spite of the fact that the bank's
dishonest agent had prevented it from receiving notice of the true owner by short-
cutting the ordinary collection routine.4 It is no defense to the liability of the bank
for checks collected that an agent of the depositor caused it to pay wrongfully by
forging endorsements to checks deposited, 5 or by forging signatures or endorsements
to checks drawn on the depositor's account.0 Nor is it a defense that the negligence
or dishonesty of one of the bank's employees caused the loss, since non-performance
of a contractual duty of the bank, not the responsibility of the bank for its agent's
tort or crime, is the basis of the cause of action.7 This would indicate that banks
should either devise a bookkeeping system whereby the endorsements of checks
deposited could be rechecked against the amounts credited to individual depositors
by posting the amounts shown on deposit slips, or, if that would be too expensive,
should make certain that the bonds of employees who have access to the "block"
department would cover this type of diversion.
It is, however, a defense to the bank to show that the depositor has injured the
bank by failing to report a discrepancy between the statement rendered by the bank
and the books of the depositor.8 The notice conveyed by the bank statement as to
3. 5 Mrc , BA-vxs AND BAxxG (1931) 14, §§ 1-9.
4. See Potts & Co. v. Lafayette Nat. Bank, 269 N. Y. 181, 186, 199 N. E. 50, 51. This
goes beyond the rule stated in such cases as Bristol Knife Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 41
Conn. 421 (1874); Robbins v. Passaic Nat. Bank, 109 N. J. L. 250, 160 Aft. 418 (1932);
Sims v. U. S. Trust Co., 103 N. Y. 472, 9 N. E. 605 (1886); Wagner Trading Co.
v. Battery Park Nat. Bank, 228 N. Y. 37, 126 N. E. 347 (1920) in that the special
endorsement was here concealed by the bank's agent. However, the extension to the
present case of the rule of notice in those cases seems correct. Cf. Merrill, Bankers' Lia-
bility for Deposits of a Fiduciary to his Personal Account (1927) 40 HAnv. L. REv. 1077.
5. 5 M crx=, BAN-xs AND BAxmcnO (1931) 498, § 274.
6. Id. at 506, 513, §§ 276, 277b.
7. City Nat. Bank of Bryan v. Gustavus, 77 S. W. (2d) 565 (Tex. 1934); Brown v.
Lynchburg Nat. Bank, 109 Va. 530, 64 S. E. 950 (1909); 2 MEcumr, Aoms.c (2d ed.
1914) § 1931; 5 Mic H, BAKs AND BAN=G (1931) 43 § 20.
8. Leather Manufacturer's Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96 (1886); Hammer ehlag
Mfg. Co. v. Importers & Trade)rs Nat. Bank, 262 Fed. 266 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Dana v.
Nat. Bank of the Republic, 132 Mass. 156 (1882); Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171
N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969 (1902); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Nat. Bank of Commerce,
227 N. Y. 510, 125 N. E. 824 (1920); Greenwood v. Martin's Bank, [1933] A. C. 51 (H. L.) ;
Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to his Bank (1922) 31 Yar L. J.
598; Notes L. R. A. 1915D 741; (1921) 15 A. L. R. 159; (1930) 67 A. L. R. 1121.
This l ule is occasionally qualified by holding the bank liable because its negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss. First Nat. Bank of Phila. v. Farrell, 272 Fed. 371 (C. C. A.
3d, 1921); Union Tool Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac.
424 (1923); Graham v. Southington Bank & Trust Co., 99 Conn. 494, 121 At. 812 (1923).
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the disposition of the checks deposited gives rise to a duty of the depositor to prevent
further loss by reporting any errors. There is here, however, an additional factor
which is not present when notice is conveyed by something the import of which
is at once apparent, such as a deposit slip or indorsement. The depositor, in order
to discover whether or not the bank statement reveals a discrepancy which he must
report, must check it against the deposits and withdrawals recorded in his cash book.
This has led in some cases to a limitation of the duty which receipt of a bank
statement creates in a depositor to a duty to report any discrepancy which the
exercise of due care in examining the statement would reveal.9  Thus if the dis-
crepancy is one which an honest employee might have discovered by the exercise of
due care, the fact that a dishonest employee failed to report it does not excuse the
depositor.' 0 Similarly, if the statement is received and concealed by the dishonest
employee, it is nevertheless notice to the principal, and imposes upon him the duty
of examining it, just as the endorsement of checks delivered to the bank imposed
a duty upon it in spite of the fact that its agent kept this notice from his principal.
As a practical matter, therefore, the only way for depositors to prevent losses due
to the dishonesty of an employee would be to have their cash books audited monthly
with the bank statement by someone other than the employee who makes the bank
deposit and handles the check book.
These respective duties of bank and depositor, and the administrative measures
necessary to prevent their breach, seem sound when approached from the point of
view of administration of the risk of such a series of defalcations as occurred in
the instant case.1 l During the period between the deposit of a check and the time
when the next monthly statement of the bank reaches the depositor, the bank is
in the best position to prevent the risk of loss, since all the transactions occur within
its doors. It also is more likely to have taken the precaution of shifting the risk
by bonding its employees than are most of its depositors. After, however, a state-
ment has been issued to a depositor, the opportunity for p'revention of further loss
is clearly in the hands of the depositor.12 And even though few small businesses may
be likely to make an independent audit of their bank statements, it nevertheless
seems reasonable, in view of the strict liability imposed upon the bank for losses
occurring within the first month, to place a limit on its liability for further loss
in this way.
9. Takenaka v. Bankers Trust Co., 132 Misc. 322, 229 N. Y. Supp. 499 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1928), affd 251 N. Y. 521, 168 N. E. 412 (1929). This is to be distinguished from
the absolute duty to report which is imposed when the depositor has actual knowledge.
Bank of Occaquan v. Bushey, 156 Va. 25, 157 S. E. 764 (1931).
10. National Dredging Co. v. President, etc., of Farmers Bank, 6 Pen. 980, 69 Atl,
607 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1908); Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969
(1902); 5 MicHiz, BAKs Mm BA.xwNO (1931) 554, § 285.
11. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YArxs L. J.
584, 720.
12. Upon receipt of the statement, the depositor may be in a position, by prompt notice
to the bank, to enable the latter to recompense itself for a loss already suffered, that Is,
suffered during the first month following the beginning of the series of deposits. This was
true in the instant case, since the depositor's delay in giving notice to the bank prevented
recovery by the bank against its surety. See supra note 2. In such a situation, the depositor
should be, and seemingly was held in the instant case, to have assumed the rlsk of loss
for the entire period of the diversions, including the period between the beginning of the
diversions and the first monthly bank statement.
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TESTATRIX'S DEVISE OF HUSBAND'S PROPERTY UNDER THE NEW Yom DECED-.T
ESTATE LAW
TESTATRIX and her husband owned certain property by the entirety, which, by
operation of law, went to the husband immediately upon her death. In her will,
testatrix, presumably mistakenly believing that she owned the property alone, ordered
its sale and provided for the distribution of the proceeds to certain legatees. She
also created a trust of the residue of her estate, the income from which vas to go
to her husband for life. The husband filed an election to take under Section IS
of the N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, the applicable provision of which gave him the
limited right to take $2500 absolutely out of the principal of the trust, the trust
otherwise remaining effective. A legatee claimed that this constituted an election
to take under the will since the husband thus received the benefit of the trust set
up under the will, and that consequently the husband must obey the equitable rule
that a legatee who chooses to take under a will is bound, in the interests of carrying
out the testamentary scheme, to surrender any of his property devised by that will.
The surrogate, however, interpreting the statute as incorporating the trust provision
of the will into the intestate scheme, held that the husband was taking against the
will and could retain his property.'
If a testator leaves Blackacre to A and Greenacre, which actually belong to A,
to B, it would dearly be a distortion of the testamentary intent to allow A both to
take Blackacre and retain Greenacre. Hence, to carry out the testator's desire to
give something to B, there has developed the rule that if A elects to take Blackacre
under the will, he must give Greenacre to B, while if A elects to retain Greenacre he
must renounce the will, in which case Blackacre is given to B, as disappointed legatee.2
In effect, this is a compensatory device to assure the disappointed legatee of receiving
either the mistakenly devised property or the electing legatee's renounced legacies.
But clearly this compensation is at the electing legatee's expense, and rests on the
presumption that had the testator known of his mistake, he would have desired to
reduce the electing legatee's share in favor of the disappointed legatee. But while this
presumption may be justifiable where the disappointed legatee is a natural object
of the testator's beneficence,3 such as a child, the presumption becomes doubtful where
it allows a stranger to benefit at the expense of a spouse.
4
1. In Re Collins Estate, 156 fisc. 783, 282 N. Y. Supp. 728 (Surr. Ct. 1935). The
proceeds of the mistakenly devised property were to be used to satisfy certain demon-
strative legacies. Had the husband surrendered the property, the residue of the (state
including this property would have been greater than his intestate share, making Section 18,
1(b) applicable, and giving him only the limited light to take 2500 absolutely. But the
result of allowing the husband to retain his property was to compel payment of the demon-
strative legacies out of the residue, thereby reducing the residue to below the husband's
intestate share. The surrogate therefore applied Section 18, 1, giving the husband one-half
of the estate outright. Properly Section 18, 1(f) would seem applicable, under which the
trust is retained, the husband being given outright only the difference between his intestate
share and the trust.
2. 1 PoSmoY, EQc-rz JuispsuENcE (4th ed. 1918) § 462 et seq. See inIra notes
3 and 4.
3. Mforath's Ex'r v. Weber's Adm'r, 124 Ky. 128, 98 S. W. 321 (1906); Smith v. Guild,
34 Me. 443 (1852); Beetson v. Stoops, 186 N. Y. 456, 79 N. E. 731 (1906); In Re Ballard's
Will, 194 App. Div. 106, 185 N. . Supp. 71S (4th Dept. 1920).
4. The doctrine applies where a spouse's property is devised. Job Haines' Home v.
Keene, 87 N. '. Eq. 509, 101 At. 512 (Ch. 1917); Shanley v. Shanley, 22 App. Div.
375, 48 N. Y. Supp. 32 (2d Dept. 1S97); In Re McGrath's Estate, 129 MIsc. 514, 222
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Section 18 of the N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, under which the husband in the
instant case elected to take, was expressly passed to prevent disinheritance of a
surviving spouse, a frequent occurrence under the prior system of dower and curtesy.5
Similar to statutes in other states,6 it provides that where there is a will, a surviving
spouse may take his or her 7 intestate shares up to one-half of the estate.0 B'ut in
order that a decedent may safeguard a spendthrift spouse, the novel provisions were
adopted, first, that where the surviving spouse is left the income for life from a
trust at least as large as his intestate share, he has only the limited right of taking
$2500 of the trust absolutely, the will otherwise remaining effective; l 0 and second,
that where at least $2500 is given absolutely, and the rest of his intestate share
left in trust, the spouse has no right whatever under the statute.11 The instant
case involves a will falling within the first provision 0 and containing a mistaken
devise of the husband's property. To hold, as in the instant case, that the husband
is taking against the will, even though benefitting by its provisions, and that he may
therefore retain his own mistakenly-devised property causes the legatee of that
property to lose his legacy. But since by force of the statute the will remains
effective except for the $2500 deduction from the trust, the husband cannot be
required to renounce his legacy under the will. Thus there can be no renounced
legacy with which to compensate the disappointed legatee. But on the other hand,
to hold that the husband is taking under the will and must surrender his own
property might result in reducing his net benefits from the estate to below the
intended statutory minimum. The surrogate, impressed by the importance of keep-
ing the statutory minimum inviolate,12 resolved this conflict by holding that, since
the statute in form gave a general right to take as by intestacy,8 the husband
was taking against the will even though his right was, by a later provision, strictly
limited.' 0
N. Y. Supp. 262 (Su'rr. Ct. 1927); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 111 Va. 325, 68 S, E. 990
(1910); Moore v. Baker, 4 Ind. App. 115, 30 N. E. 629 (1892). But in all case3 of
election the intent to devise the property in question must be absolutely clear. Crump
v. Redd's Adm'r, 47 Va. 372 (1849). And in the case of a spouse, the courts seem unusually
ready, by finding no clear intent, to avoid 'requiring an election. Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal.
252 (1855); Herrick v. Miller, 69 Wash. 456, 125 Pac. 974 (1912). But cf. Estate of
Stewart, 74 Cal. 98, 15 Pac. 445 (1887).
5. Report of Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates, N. Y. Leg.
Doc. (1930) No. 69, 86-8, 273, 276-7.
6. The Pennsylvania statute was used as a partial model. PA. STAT. Aim. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 20, § 261. In all, about 12 states have similar provisions, see Report of Cons-
mission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates, N. Y. Leg. Doc. (1930) No. 69,
295, et seq.
7. The statute is equally applicable to either spouse, but for simplicity, only the husband
will be considered.
8. New York Decedent Estate Law § 18, 1.
9. Id. § 18, 1(a). 10. Id. § 18, 1(b).
11. Id. § 18, l(d).
12. The New York courts have repeatedly construed Section 18 liberally so as to pro-
tect the statutory minimum. In Re Byrnes Estate, 141 Misc. 346, 252 N. Y. Supp. 587
(Surr. Ct. 1931) (income for life or until remarriage held not proper life estate); In Re
Harris' Estate, 150 Misc. 758, 271 N. Y. Supp. 464 (Surr. Ct. 1934) (spouse gets one-half
of total estate, not just one-half of estate within New York); In Re Curley's Will, 151
Misc. 664, 272 N. Y. Supp. 489 (Surr. Ct. 1934), modified, 245 App. Dlv. 255, 280 N. Y.
Supp. 80 (2d Dept. 1935), aff'd, N. Y. Court of Appeals, Nov. 20, 1935.
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While the result in the instant case seems fair,13 the broader question as to when,
if ever, a surviving spouse in New York must surrender mistakenly devised property
can not be solved satisfactorily merely by determining, through statutory construc-
tion, whether a surviving spouse is taking under or against the will. 1 For even
if far more than the statutory minimum is given the spouse in trust, a will would
fall within the first provision o if there was not an absolute bequest of $2500. But
then to hold, as in the instant case, that the disappointed legatee receives absolutely
nothing, would seem unfair.15  On the other hand, if the will left a spouse $2500
absolutely and his intestate share in trust, it would fall within the residual class
of cases of provision two,"1 in which, since the will leaves the spouse at least his
statutory minimum, the spouse is denied the power to elect to take under the statute.
In that case, should a husband desire to take his trust, it would seem that he could
do so only by taking directly under the will,1 6 thereby, under the doctrine of election,
being compelled to surrender his own property. In such a situation, therefore, the
identical reduction of net benefits below the statutory minimum that the surrogate
in this case tried to guard against is threatened.
The statute so combines the normal concepts of taking under and against a will
that the compensatory purpose of the doctrine of election is lost sight of; the only
method of compensating the disappointed legatee would therefore seem to lie in
going behind the verbal distinctions between the concepts of taking under and
against the will. When the statute keeps the spouse from having to renounce his
legacies under the will, the only possible source of compensation lies in the mistakenly
devised property. It would therefore seem that, where the spouse is taking under
the statute, the fairest reconciliation of the conflicting equities of the spouse and
the disappointed legatee would consist in requiring the spouse to surrender the
mistakenly devised property insofar as that does not reduce his net benefits below
the statutory minimum. On the other hand, when the will, by leaving the husband
his statutory minimum, prevents him from taking under the statute, and he then
takes under the will, he should not be compelled to surrender so much of his
property as to reduce his net benefits below the statutory minimum. Such a solution
is simple if the courts will frankly realize that, since the doctrine of election is only
an equitable device, it should not be allowed to defeat the legislative purpose to
provide adequately for the surviving spouse.
13. In this case the disappointed legatee is a charity. Hence, as has been suggested earliet,
the doctrine of election seems contrary to testamentary intent.
14. A will might leave the spouse his statutory minimum if the mistakenly devised
property were included in the estate, and hence give him no election under the statute,
and yet the same will might give him less than his statutory minimum if the mistakenly
devised property is excluded from the estate, and hence give him an election under the
statute. This dilemma seems insoluble so far as statutory construction is concerned.
15. Cf. In Re Smith's Estate, 150 Misc. 367, 269 N. Y. Supp. 270 (Surr. Ct. 1934)
(legatee a child).
16. Admittedly the two provisions of Section 18 under discussion are almost identical
in purpose and effect, and should therefore be construed, if possible, so as to reach similar
results. But in holding that the husband, in taking under the first provision, was taking
against the will, the surrogate relied on the statutory language permitting a limited right
to elect under the statute and providing that the rest of the will shall be effective. Since
the second provision contains no such language and expressly denies a right to elect to
take under the statute, it would seem almost impossible to reach a similar interpretation.
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VALIDITY OF CONTRACTUAL STIPULATION GIVING EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION To THE
COURTS OF ONE STATE
GOODS were sold by the defendant, a Louisiana department store, under a contract
containing express provisions that any action brought against the defendant arising
out of the sale must be brought in the domiciliary state of the defendant and that
the plaintiff waived any statutory provisions giving him a right to sue elsewhere.
An action was brought in New York, and the defendant moved to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. The Appellate Term affirmed a denial of the motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the stipulation was contrary to public policy and that the waiver
was ineffective because it attempted to achieve the same result. There was a dis-
sent on the ground that, since agreements to arbitrate are now enforced, public
policy can no longer be opposed to agreements to litigate in a certain court.1
Contractual stipulations providing that certain tribunals, whether judicial or arbi-
tral, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over future disputes have generally been held
to be against public policy under the general theory that matters of remedy, being
regulated by law, are not subject to alteration by agreement of the parties prior to a
breach of the contract.2 But where the parties to a contract seem fully justified, in
the light of particular factors, in desiring to alter normal procedure, there has been
a tendency to enforce their agreements. Thus, the courts of some states allow
the parties to a contract to provide that in case of future disputes there shall be a
waiver of jury trial,3 or an alteration of the period of limitations, 4 or an abrogation
of certain rules of evidence.6  Further, with the spread of arbitration and the realiza-
tion of its advantages in commercial disputes, the legislatures of many states, in-
cluding New York, have passed statutes providing for the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements. 6 But, because of the danger of giving parties with superior bar-
gaining power control over remedial processes, alterations of matters of remedy havo
1. Parker v. Krauss Co. Ltd., 157 Misc. 667, 284, N. Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
2. Wood & Selick v. Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 43 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d,
1930); Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 174 (1856); Nashua River Paper
Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N. E. 678 (1916); cf. Insurance Co. v.
Morse, 20 Wall 445 (U. S. 1874); see 3 WILmsTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1725; Note (1929)
59 A. L, R. 1445. But this rule has been strongly criticized by courts that felt bound by
it. U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S, D.
N. Y. 1915); President of the Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., go N. Y. 250
(1872). It has, to some extent, been evaded by making partial arbitration a condition
precedent to suit. Hamilton v. Liverpool, London, & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242 (1890) ;
Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811 (1856). Further, the American Law Institute Restate-
ment states that such stipulations are generally valid, RESTATmIEU T, CorNc'r or LAws
(1934) § 617, comment, and is supported by some cases. Mittenthal v. Maseagnt, 183
Mass. 19, 66 N. E. 425 (1903); Harbis v. Cudahy Packing Co., 211 Mo. App. 188, 241
S. W. 960 (1921).
3. Waterside Holding Corp. v. Lask, 233 App. Div. 456, 253 N. Y. Supp. 183 (1st
Dep't 1931); see Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 376.
4. There is no doubt that the period of limitations may be shortened. Riddlesbarger
v. Hartford Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386 (U. S. 1868). A few courts have even allowed
a lengthening of the period of limitations. See Comment (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 383,
389. For the English view, see (1934) 4 FORT. L. J. 24.
S. Steen v. Modem Woodmen of America, 296 Ill. 104, 129 N. E. $46 (1920). This
is, however, clearly the minority rule. Note (1933) 82 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 56.
6. For a collection of state statutes, see Phillips, Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws:
A Study of Benevolent Compulsion (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 197.
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been allowed only where the practical justification seems sufficient to outweigh the
possible danger.
Although agreements to arbitrate and stipulations giving exclusive jurisdiction to
certain courts were originally classified together, the validation of the former is not
conclusive that the latter are now justifiable, for while the former are used to
provide a more competent forum for settling certain types of disputes, the latter
are used primarily for purposes of geographical convenience. 7 But since a party to
a contract can, by the use of such devices as service on an agent, garnishment, and
foreign attachment, often bring suit in many states,8 there is practical justification
for allowing the parties to a contract to protect themselves from possible serious
future inconvenience by choosing in advance one of the available forums. Further,
it can thus be arranged in advance that the contract be interpreted by the courts of
the state whose law is applicable. That these advantages are real is evidenced by
the fact that such stipulations are used and enforced in England,0 France,1 0 and Ger-
many."z Yet there is the objection that, in the hands of a party with superior bar-
gaining power, such stipulations give the future defendant to an action control over
the place of trial, with the danger that it may be exercised so as unreasonably to re-
strict the plaintiff's choice of forum.
If stipulations conferring exclusive jurisdiction on certain courts are to be en-
forced, there is presented the problem as to how this should be accomplished. England
has enforced such stipulations under its arbitration statute by holding that an agree-
ment to litigate in a certain court comes within the statutory definition of agreements
to arbitrate.' 2 But while the English arbitration statute gives the court discretion
as to whether it should stay a suit in violation of the arbitration agreement,13 the
New York statute makes such a stay compulsory.' 4 To prevent the misuse of stipu-
lations of the instant type, it is important that a court asked to surrender its juris-
diction by enforcing such a stipulation should have discretion to consider whether
the locality selected has some reasonable relation either to the contract or to the
domicile or place of business of the contracting parties'3 and to assure itself that the
7. The argument in favor of stipulations giving exclusive jurisdiction to certain courts
is in one respect stronger than that in favor of arbitration agreements, in that the former
provide a formal tribunal while the latter provide an irregular one. See Mleacham v.
Jamestown F. & C. Rr. Co., 211 N. Y. 346, 353, 105 N. E. 653, 655 (1914). For this
reason France early permitted stipulations giving exclusive jurisdiction to foreign courts,
Cie. Florio Rubattino v. Bernex Freres, Cass. (Civ.) Feb. 29, 1888, 3 REv. L,'r. DU
Dsorr MAfAsr 657, although arbitration agreements were not generally pmitted until
1925. See Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-Inernational and Interstate Aspects (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 716, 721, 743.
8. Recent extensions in jurisdiction are fully treated in a Comment in this issue supra p.
1100.
9. Law v. Garret, 8 Ch. Div. 26 (1878); The Cap Blanco [1913] Prob. Div. 130;
Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life Ass. Soc. Ltd. [1903] 1 K. B. 249.
10. Lorenzen, The French Rules of the Conflict of Laws (1927) 36 YIrXn L. J.
731, 741.
11. Lorenzen, The Conflict of Laws in Germany (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 804, 825, 826.
12. The Cap Blanco (1913] Prob. Div. 130; see RussEmr,, AarrRAo. aum AwArm
(13th ed. 1935) 489.
13. ABmInoTTON AcT, 52 & 53 Vicr., c. 49, § 4. See RussELx, op. cit. sup'a note 12
at 83, 95, 99, 486.
14. N. Y. Aimn-rro-N LAw (1930) § 5. For a criticism of this as applied to arbi-
tration agreements, see Phillips, The Paradox in Abitratdon Law: Compulsion as AP-
plied to a Voluntary Proceeding (1933) 46 H/mV. L. REv. 1258.
15. "Reasonable relation" will require fairly definite interpretation, for, since such a
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court selected has unquestioned jurisdiction over the subject matter,10 and is capable of
acquiring jurisdiction over the person.' 7 It would therefore appear undesirable for the
New York courts, which are given no such discretion under the New York arbitration
statute, to adopt the English device of bringing stipulations of the instant type within
the scope of the arbitration statute. Rather, enforcement should be based on a reversal
of the old rule and a frank recognition that such stipulations are no longer contrary to
public policy.' 8 Then, if suit were brought in violation of such an agreement, the court
could exercise discretion to determine whether jurisdiction should be assumed despite
the stipulation by considering whether the choice of forum was unreasonable.' 0 By
this means the stipulation would operate not as an ouster of jurisdiction, but rather
as a basis for a voluntary surrender of jurisdiction, similar to that obtaining where a
court declines to entertain jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum von conveniens.2-0
stipulation is intended to prevent litigation outside the selected locality, even on the Issue
of jurisdiction, it is useful only if the parties can be fairly sure in advance not only that
the stipulation will be upheld, but also that its validity will be so clear that neither party
will even attempt to bring suit elsewhere.
16. This problem might arise if the action were local, or the selected court a federal
court, or other court of limited jurisdiction.
17. This seems adequately satisfied in the instant stipulation in that the domiciliary
state of the defendant was chosen.
18. Their invalidity does not seem so settled in New York as not to be open to recon-
sideration, for although several lower courts, relying on dicta in Meacham v. Jamestown
F. & Co. Rr. Co., 211 N. Y. 346, 352-4, 105 N. E. 653, 655-6 (1914), have held such stipu-
lations invalid (Sudbury v. Ambi Verwaltung, 213 App. Div. 98, 210 N. Y. Supp. 164
(1st Dep't 1925); Application of Hamburg-American Line, 135 Misc. 715, 238 N. Y. Supp.
331 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 228 App. Div. 802, 239 N. Y. Supp, 914 (1st Dep't 1930).
Contra: Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210 N. Y. Supp. 10 (Sup. Ct.
1925)], the Court of Appeals, in arbitration cases, has made some vague references that
cast doubt on this rule. Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N. Y, 261,
130 N. E. 288 (1921); Gilbert v. BurnStine, 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931). See
RxsTATEMENT, CoNLicT or LAws, N. Y. ANx. (1935) § 617.
19. From the procedural standpoint, the English rule that such a stipulation creates
a prima fade case for dismissal seems excellent. Kirchner v. Gruban [19091 1 Ch. 413.
20. See Part II of Comment, supra p. 1100, section on Discretion in the Trial Court, to
appear in the next issue.
